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WEDLOCK ALERT: A COMMENT ON LESBIAN
AND GAY FAMILY RECOGNITION
Paula L. Ettelbrick*
INTRODUCTION
As a result of the Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v
Lewin,' the issue of same-sex marriage has been catapulted onto
the national stage as a matter for discussion and legislative action.2
. Legislative Counsel, Empire State Pride Agenda; Adjunct Lecturer in Law,
University of Michigan Law School. J.D., Wayne State University Law School,
1984; B.A., Northern Illinois University, 1978. Sincere thanks to Lisa Bennett,
Katherine Franke and my dearest family member, Suzanne Goldberg, for their
ever thoughtful comments and suggestions. Special thanks to Ross Levi for
research assistance, and to Linda Giardino, Joe Hoefferle and the editorial staff
of Brooklyn Law School's Journal of Law and Policy for their patience, tenacity
and efforts beyond the call of duty. Finally, thanks to two particularly special
colleagues who for many years have nurtured me, my thinking and my work
through their eloquent advocacy, brilliant strategies and life-long devotion to
creating a world that dignifies the love and families of lesbians and gay men:
Nancy Polikoff and Tom Stoddard.
852 P.2d 44, 55-60 (Haw. 1993) (holding that marriage laws prohibiting
same-sex couples from marrying violate state constitutional proscription against
sex discrimination).
2 The Hawaii Supreme Court's decision in Baehr v. Lewin has prompted
both national debate and national backlash to the effort to extend legal marriage
to same-sex couples. See Jeffrey Schmalz, In Hawaii, Step Toward Legalized
Gay Marriage, N.Y. TIMES, May 7, 1993, at A14 (noting that Hawaii is very
close to becoming the first state in the nation to recognize same-sex marriages
because its highest court ruled that a ban on such marriages violated the state
constitution's prohibition against sex discrimination). The Republican presidential
primaries were tarnished by a rally against same-sex marriage that was supported
by most of the contenders for the Republican nomination for President of the
United States. See Richard L. Berke, With the Field Now Scrambled, Iowans
Prepare to Vote, N.Y. TIMEs, Feb. 11, 1996, § 1, at 26 (noting that Republican
presidential candidates Patrick J. Buchanan, Phil Gramm and Alan Keyes
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participated in a rally held in Iowa, entitled "The National Campaign to Protect
the Sanctity of Marriage," sponsored by a Christian right group to oppose the
legalization of same-sex marriages; candidates Senator Bob Dole, Lamar
Alexander and Steve Forbes sent letters of support in lieu of attendance at the
rally). State legislatures across the country, fearing that they might be forced to
eventually recognize the marriages of lesbian and gay couples who will
undoubtedly flock from across the country to Hawaii to get married, are
responding by passing laws prohibiting recognition of such marriages. See
Kristina Campbell, California Bill Succumbs, WASH. BLADE, Sept. 13, 1996, at
23 (noting that, to date, 38 states legislatures have proposed anti-gay marriage
laws-21 died, 15 passed into law and 2 pending); Sue Fox, Marriage Bill Sails
Through the Senate, WASH. BLADE, Sept. 13, 1996, at 1, 23 (describing reaction
to the Senate's passage of the Defense of Marriage Act which "allows states to
ignore same-sex marriages approved by other states and limits the federal
definition of marriage to a union between one man and one woman"). For
example, an amendment to the Illinois Marriage and Dissolution of Marriage Act
prohibiting "a marriage between 2 individuals of the same sex," became effective
May 24, 1996. 1996 Ill. Legis. Serv. P.A. 89-459 (West) (codified as 750 ILL.
COMP. STAT. 5/212(5)). See, e.g., ARIZ. REV. STAT. ANN. § 25-101(c) (West
1991 & Supp. 1996) (declaring marriages between persons of the same sex void
and prohibited); GA. CODE ANN. § 19-3-3.1 (Supp. 1996) (prohibiting same-sex
marriages and declaring void any marriage entered into by persons of the same
sex pursuant to a marriage license issued by another state); LA. CIV. CODE ANN.
art. 89 (West 1993) ("Persons of the same sex may not contract marriage with
each other."); S.C. CODE ANN. §§ 20-1-10, -15 (Law. Co-op. Supp. 1996)
(prohibiting and deeming void same-sex marriages as against public policy);
UTAH CODE ANN. § 30-1-2(5) (1995) (prohibiting and declaring void marriages
between "persons of the same sex").
The U.S. Congress has also taken the unprecedented step of defining
marriage, rather than deferring to state's definitions as had been the practice. The
Defense of Marriage Act ("DOMA") was signed into law on September 21, 1996
by President Clinton. DOMA provides:
No state, territory, or possession of the United States, or Indian tribe,
shall be required to give effect to any public act, record, or judicial
proceeding of any other state, territory, possession, or tribe respecting
a relationship between persons of the same sex that is treated as a
marriage under the laws of such other State, territory, possession, or
tribe, or a right or claim arising from such relationship.
Defense of Marriage Act, Pub. L. No. 104-199, § 2, 110 Stat. 2419 (1996)
(codified as 28 U.S.C. § 1738C) (DOMA is "an Act to define and protect the
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As the first state court in the country to question the constitu-
tionality of laws that deny lesbian and gay couples access to
marriage, the court unleashed a rabid reaction from those deeply
opposed to lesbian and gay equality. The decision has also released
the longing and expectations of many lesbians and gay men who
wish to marry. This Article is prompted not by the fury of the right
wing backlash to the possibility of same-sex marriage, but by the
reaction of some within the lesbian and gay community who have
latched onto marriage as the panacea for homophobia. I do not
argue with the sincerity of their desire to marry nor with their right
to participate in the institution of marriage. Instead, I am prompted
to write based upon my concern that we will short change our lives
and our families by adopting marriage as the sole family recog-
nition strategy. I am also troubled by the trends of trivializing the
important gains of domestic partnership, of dismissing the complex-
ities of many lesbian and gay families who do not, and never will,
fit neatly into the marriage model and of failing to acknowledge
and build on the history of lesbian and gay family advocacy that
has provided the context for serious discussion of same-sex
marriage.
Over the last two decades, advocates for lesbian and gay
equality have propelled lesbian and gay families from their
erstwhile status of oxymoron to a solid position within the fringes
of the definition of the term "family."3 The struggle of lesbian and
institution of marriage"). DOMA limited the definition of marriage by adding the
following:
In determining the meaning of any Act of Congress, or of any ruling,
regulation, or interpretation of the various administrative bureaus and
agencies of the United States, the word "marriage" means only a legal
union between one man and one woman as husband and wife, and the
word "spouse" refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a
husband or a wife.
Id. § 3 (codified as amended at 1 U.S.C. § 7).
3 The elements of family are complex, intangible and incapable of full
discussion within the boundaries of this Article. Love and commitment,
caregiving, a sharedjourney, a guiding hand, companionship, economic security,
sexual desire and responsibility are some of the elements, though admittedly they
are the most romanticized. Being a family member is hard work, occasionally
thankless, and often frustrating. Whether it be financial, emotional or physical,
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gay parents to hold on to custody of and visitation with their
children has moved many courts to reject outlandish stereotypes
and to acknowledge that one's sexual orientation is not a predictor
of parental ability.4 A growing number of courts and employers
caretaking among family members is indispensable to the functioning of society.
Parents take care of young children; adult children take care of elderly parents;
spouses take care of each other; and aunts, uncles, cousins, siblings and
grandparents are all part of this caretaking network. Without such networks
society would be ill-equipped to perform the functions of home health aid,
counselor, chauffeur, physical therapist, advocate, babysitter, maid and nurse for
each person who needed those services.
Professor Stephanie Coontz begins her course on family history by asking
her students to write down what "'traditional family"' means to them. STEPHANIE
COONTZ, THE WAY WE NEVER WERE: AMERICAN FAMILIES AND THE
NOSTALGIA TRAP 8 (1992). One of the more frequent responses
is of extended families in which all members worked together,
grandparents were an integral part of family life, children learned
responsibility and the work ethic from their elders, and there were
clear lines of authority based on respect for age. Another is of nuclear
families within which nurturing mothers sheltered children from
premature exposure to sex, financial worries, or other adult concerns,
while fathers taught adolescents not to sacrifice their education by
going to work too early. Still another image gives pride of place to
couple relationship. In traditional families, [her] students write ...
men and women remained chaste until marriage, at which time they
extricated themselves from competing obligations to kin and neighbors
and committed themselves wholly to the marital relationship, experi-
encing an all-encompassing intimacy that our more crowded modem
life seems to preclude.
Id. "The modern family is, in fact, a number of different families." JAN E.
DIZARD & HOWARD GADLIN, THE MINIMAL FAMILY 23 (1990).
The specific form a given family takes is a function of what the
individuals involved bring to their relationship, the sum of their
convictions, their ethnic traditions, and their own, personal desires and
aspirations. But these individual qualities do not exist in a vacuum. At
any moment in time, society makes some relationships more likely or
more durable, by virtue of the resources it makes available as well as
the kinds of aspirations it encourages.
Id.
4 There are still many chilling exceptions to this trend, as evidenced by the
recently expressed views of South Dakota Supreme Court Justice Frank E.
Henderson, in a case in which the court restricted a lesbian mother's visitation
FAMILY RECOGNITION
have begun to acknowledge the integrity of lesbian and gay family
relationships5 by embracing concepts such as "second parent
adoption ' 6 and "domestic partnership."7 Furthermore, courts have
extended the definition of "family" to include lesbian and gay
rights because she lived with her partner:
Lesbian mother has harmed these children forever. To give her rights
of reasonable visitation so that she can teach them to be homosexuals,
would be the zenith of poor judgment for the judiciary of this state.
Until such time that she can establish, after years of therapy and
demonstrated conduct, that she is no longer a lesbian living a life of
abomination (see Leviticus 18:22), she should be totally estopped from
contaminating these children.
Chicoine v. Chicoine, 479 N.W.2d 891, 896 (S.D. 1992) (Henderson, J.,
concurring in part and dissenting in part).
5 See generally Craig A. Bowman & Blake M. Cornish, Note, A More
Perfect Union: A Legal and Social Analysis of Domestic Partnership Ordinances,
92 COLUM. L. REv. 1164, 1187 (1992) (discussing how domestic partnership
laws can compensate for defects in domestic relations laws that fail to recognize
nontraditional relationships); Robert Ceniceros, Domestic Partners Offered
Broader Range of Benefits, Bus. INS., June 12, 1995, at 2 (noting that, as of
1995, more than 200 entities offer employment benefits for unmarried partners).
6 "Second parent adoption" is a term of art developed by lesbian and gay
family advocates to identify the process whereby the unmarried partner of a
biological or adoptive parent may adopt the child. See Nancy D. Polikoff, This
Child Does Have Two Mothers: Redefining Parenthood to Meet the Needs of
Children in Lesbian-Mother and Other Nontraditional Families, 78 GEO. L.J.
459, 467 n.27 (1990) [hereinafter Polikoff, Redefining Parenthood]; Elizabeth
Zuckerman, Comment, Second Parent Adoption for Lesbian-Parented Families:
Legal Recognition of the Other Mother, 19 U.C. DAVIS L. REv. 729, 731 n.8
(1986) (defining second parent adoption as "the adoption of a child by [his or]
her parent's non-marital partner, without requiring the first parent to give up any
rights or responsibilities to the child").
' "Domestic partnership" refers to the relationship of unmarried cohabitants.
See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 5, at 1164 n.3 ("Domestic partnership
generally refers to two people living together in a committed, mutually
interdependent relationship."). The term was developed and is primarily used to
designate the non-spousal relationships that are appropriate for receiving
employer-provided health benefits. As such, domestic partnership is not a
substitute for marriage, as it has little practical application outside of the
workplace, but is a term of art developed within the employment benefit context.
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couples,' and the relationships between non-biological lesbian
parents and the children they raise with their partners have
increasingly gained recognition in the contexts of adoption,
guardianship and custody.9
Yet, within the lesbian and gay community, debate has
simmered for years over the strategies for seeking recognition of
the committed family relationships of lesbian and gay couples.' °
Two basic strategies prevail: (1) that which seeks the right to same-
' See, e.g., In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 794 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991)
(considering lesbian couple a "family by affinity"); Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74
N.Y.2d 201, 212-13, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54-55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 789-90 (1989)
(ruling that surviving gay partner is a family member under rent control laws).
9 See, e.g., In re Astonn H., N.Y. L.J., Nov. 1, 1995, at 33 (Fam. Ct. Nov.
1, 1995) (awarding guardianship to natural mother's partner and not to estranged
husband because she was the "only stable loving presence in child's life"); see
also J.A.L. v. E.P.H., No. 02456, 1996 Pa. Super. LEXIS 3215, at *20 (Pa.
Super. Ct. Sept. 19, 1996) (holding that non-biological lesbian co-parent had
standing to seek partial custody on grounds that she functioned as a parent with
the encouragement of the biological mother); infra note 153 (setting forth cases
supporting second parent adoption).
0 While many have participated in the public discussion, this debate is most
often considered to be framed by a pair of articles written by Tom Stoddard and
I when we worked together at Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund-he
as the executive director and I as the legal director. See Thomas B. Stoddard,
Why Gay People Should Have the Right to Marry, OUT/LOOK NAT'L GAY &
LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE 13-19
(Suzanne Sherman, ed., 1992) [hereinafter LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE]; Paula
L. Ettelbrick, Since When Is Marriage a Path to Liberation?, OUT/LOOK NAT'L
GAY & LESBIAN Q., Fall 1989, reprinted in LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE,
supra, at 20-26. For further discussion of the community's debate about
marriage, see WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, THE CASE FOR SAME-SEX MARRIAGE 51-
85 (1996). For other community viewpoints, see Symposium, Debating the Fight
for Same-Sex Marriage, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 4,
including the following articles: Cathy Cohen, The Price of Inclusion in the
Marriage Club, GAY CoMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 27; Lisa
Duggan, The Marriage Juggernaut, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring
1996, at 5; Paula Ettelbrick, Marriage Must Not Eclipse Other Family
Organizing, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 25; Letitia Gomez,
Marriage Latino Style, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 5; Jeff
Nickels, Equality Through Marriage, GAY COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring
1996, at 25; Nancy D. Polikoff, Marriage as a Choice? Since When?, GAY
COMMUNITY NEWS, Winter-Spring 1996, at 26.
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sex marriage" as the primary means of recognizing and extending
benefits to lesbian and gay relationships, and (2) that which
advocates for broader family definitions 12 and the right to family
benefits that are not contingent upon the existence of a marital or
blood relationship. Both strategies focus on the central vision of
family that should prevail in the law, and both form a dialogue
about the role of the lesbian and gay community in developing that
vision. Should marriage continue its role as the central definitional
component of family for the purpose of receiving civic benefits?
Or, is it possible to open the definition of family to include those
who function as family, regardless of whether marriage or blood
relationships form the core of their union? 3
Those promoting this strategy are referred to in this Article as "marriage
rights advocates" or "pro-marriage advocates."
12 Those promoting this strategy are referred to generically and in this
Article as "family definition advocates" or "functional family advocates."
"3 Lesbian and gay families are not the only ones who would benefit from
continued expansion of the meaning of family. The experiences of straight,
unmarried couples show that they, too, lack a true choice; they, too, are given
the sole option of marriage if they want their family relationships recognized.
This lack of choice is exemplified by most domestic partner benefits policies
adopted by private employers who extend benefits to lesbian and gay employees
because they cannot marry, but insist that straight employees marry their partner
if they are to receive the same benefits. For example, International Business
Machines Corporation ("IBM") recently became the "largest employer yet to
extend healthcare coverage to couples of the same-sex." David W. Dunlap, Gay
Partners ofI. B.M Workers to Get Benefits, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 20, 1996, at A 18.
Under [IBM's] new benefits policy, a lesbian or gay worker who
wishes to enroll a partner must sign a notarized affidavit stating that
the couple live together in the same home, have a "committed
relationship" and are "financially interdependent." The policy does not
cover unmarried heterosexual couples [because] ... [h]eterosexual
couples have the option of getting married ....
Id. The growing numbers of unmarried, straight couples and other kinds of
undefined familial units strengthens the imperative to find alternatives to
marriage and blood as the core definitional components of family.
Over 3.5 million unmarried cohabiting couples live in the United States, and
approximately one million of them live with children under the age of 15.
BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, U.S. DEP'T OF COMMERCE, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT
OF THE U.S. 45 (1992); Elizabeth Fenner& Roberta Kirwan, Sizing Up the Risks
of Living Together, MONEY, July 1, 1995, at 96. An estimated 370,000 people
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From either perspective, lesbian and gay family advocacy
prompts provocative questions about the central elements of family:
the relevance of gender and gender roles, the commonality of love
and commitment, the best interests of children, the policy benefits
of economic and social interdependence, the role of marriage on the
cusp of the twenty-first century and the validity of legal boundaries
for the most intimate human relationships called family, particularly
when those boundaries deny basic economic benefits to groups of
people who function as families. Either way, the goal is to provide
lesbians and gay men with full rights as human beings, including
the right to form and be recognized as a family.
This Article briefly sets forth the two visions of family
promoted within the lesbian and gay community. Lest the history
behind and purposes for functional family advocacy be over-
shadowed by the whirlwind around marriage, this Article makes the
modest attempt to serve as a reminder of the many reasons why
lesbian and gay family advocates ignored marriage challenges in
favor of divorcing the requirement of marriage and blood from the
central legal definition of family. I argue, still very firmly, for
more inclusive social and legal policies that would bestow respect
and benefits upon all who assume the responsibility for and
functions of family-whether they are married or not.
I. DIFFERENCES IN VISION FOR LESBIAN AND GAY FAMILIES
It would be unfair to assume that all family definition advocates
are necessarily anti-marriage, just the same as it would be unfair to
claim that all same-sex marriage advocates are insensitive to the
merits of extending benefits and recognition beyond those who
over the age of 65 cohabit with a partner, in some cases to avoid increased taxes
on Social Security, forfeiture of a deceased spouse's pension benefits or
decreased Medicaid benefits. Id. at 100. The percentage of cohabiting, unmarried
couples between the ages of 35 and 39 increased 34% since 1980 and has
doubled for couples between the ages of 50 and 54. Gary Robertson, Taxes on
Marriage Seen to Discourage Weddings, RICHMOND TIMES DISPATCH, Jan. 22,
1996, at D6. Straight couples who choose not to marry face the same economic
and legal disadvantages as gay couples. Jay Romano, Unmarried Partners: Let
the Buyers Beware, N.Y. TIMEs, Aug. 27, 1995, § 9, at 1.
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are married. Similarly, it would be unwise to conclude that all of
those who argue for same-sex marriage share the same motivation
for doing so. The perspectives of the participants in this grand
debate are not so easily categorized. In the end, however, all of
these advocates share the same passionate goal of equal treatment
and respect for lesbian and gay families, despite the different means
by which they would accomplish that goal.
A. The Vision of Same-Sex Marriage
Lesbian and gay couples want to get married for two primary
reasons: (1) for the social acceptance and acknowledgement of their
humanity that would be accorded their relationships through
marriage, and (2) to receive the same benefits exclusively bestowed
upon married couples. As a step toward satisfying the first need,
many lesbian and gay couples, in fact, have gotten married in
churches, synagogues and backyards around the country without
waiting for society's sanction." Some gay weddings are
extraordinarily traditional and are officiated by clergy. 5 Others
are more informal, calling simply for family and friends to gather
as witnesses to the exchange of vows between two people. Still
others are decidedly unique, drawing on many traditions. 16 To all
who have witnessed such ceremonies, these couples are married.
14 See generally CEREMONIES OF THE HEART: CELEBRATING LESBIAN
UNIONS (Becky Butler ed., 1990) [hereinafter CEREMONIES] (compiling the
separate accounts of 27 lesbian couples who created ceremonies to symbolize and
acknowledge their lifetime commitment to each other); LESBIAN AND GAY
MARRIAGE, supra note 10 (compiling the stories of lesbian and gay couples who
have openly declared their commitments to each other through public ceremo-
nies).
15 For example, a pastor presided over a gay wedding ceremony which was
held in a church and involved the traditional exchange of vows and rings.
LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 10, at 185-86. In another example of
a traditional ceremony, a rabbi performed a gay marriage ceremony under a
chuppah. LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 10, at 104-05.
16 For example, a lesbian commitment ceremony held in the privacy of the
couple's home combined Native American and multi-cultural rituals and
symbolism. CEREMONIES, supra note 14, at 281-84.
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The goal of marriage rights advocates has been to give legal
meaning to these religious or social marriages.
It is certainly difficult to argue against the basic principle so
eloquently articulated by several colleagues: that lesbian and gay
couples deserve the same rights as heterosexual couples.' 7 To
them, the fact that the law could ban same-sex couples from legal
marriage and its privileges is constitutionally unacceptable.
Marriage is a fundamental right which cannot be denied to any
couple absent a compelling state interest.' s Additionally, lesbian
and gay couples are discriminated against on the basis of sex in
that women can marry men, but not women; men can marry
women, but not men.' 9
'7 Tom Stoddard, a New York City lawyer and former executive director of
Lambda Legal Defense and Education Fund, argues that equality in marriage for
gays and lesbians will provide the foundation for the end of discrimination
against gays and lesbians. Stoddard, supra note 10, at 17; see ESKRIDGE, supra
note 10, at 7-8 (explaining that for many straight Americans, "state recognition
of same-sex marriages would represent a stamp of approval for homosexual
relationships"); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold: Equal Marriage Rights
for Lesbians and Gay Men and the Intra-community Critique, 21 N.Y.U. REV.
L. & SOC. CHANGE 567, 604-08 (1995) (stating that adoption of domestic
partnership ordinances by localities is not equal to state recognition of same-sex
marriage because the economic and employment benefits of the two are not
equal, nor is the emotional symbolism the same).
8 ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 124-52. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d 44,
55-60 (Haw. 1993) (rejecting a fundamental rights argument).
'9 Baehr v. Lewin is the only marriage challenge case that has achieved at
least preliminary success. 852 P.2d 44 (Haw. 1993). Prior attempts to challenge
the marriage laws resulted in unmitigated losses as courts held fast to the
intractable definition of marriage as being only between a man and a woman. See
Dean v. District of Columbia, 653 A.2d 307, 308 (D.C. Cir. 1995) (Terry, J.,
concurring) (noting that "it is impossible for two persons of the same sex to
marry" and that such a denial is not a violation of equal rights if based upon the
definition of marriage as a legal status between "a man and a woman as husband
and wife"); Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W. 2d 588, 589 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973) (citing
the definition of marriage from three dictionaries as being between "a man and
a woman," and holding that two female appellants are prevented from marrying
each other, "not by the statute of Kentucky or the refusal of the County Court
Clerk ... to issue them a license, but rather by their own incapability of entering
into a marriage as that term is defined"); Baker v. Nelson, 191 N.W.2d 185, 186
& n.1 (Minn. 1971) (holding that a Minnesota statute "does not authorize
116
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Nevertheless, there are arguments beyond the legal realm that
give marriage advocacy its potency, and at times its controversy,
within the lesbian and gay community. For some, marriage is the
preeminent civil rights issue for lesbians and gay men,2" the
"highest public recognition of personal integrity."'" It is "the
political issue that most fully tests the dedication of people who are
not gay to full equality for gay people, and it is also the issue most
likely to lead ultimately to a world free from discrimination against
lesbians and gay men."22 One observer has sought to deliberately
provoke discussion by maintaining that "same-sex marriage is good
for gay people and good for America, and for the same reason: it
civilizes gays and it civilizes America."23
marriage between persons of the same sex and that such marriages are
accordingly prohibited" based on the common usage and definition of the term
marriage as a union between "one man and one woman"); Singer v. Hara, 522
P.2d 1187, 1189 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974) (stressing that "it is apparent from a
plain reading of [Washington's] marriage statutes that the legislature has not
authorized same-sex marriages"). The Baehr court broke from tradition and held
that the state constitution's provision banning sex discrimination prohibits the
state from excluding same-sex couples from marriage absent a compelling reason.
Baehr, 852 P.2d at 67.
20 See Steven A. Holmes, Civil Rights Dance Lesson: The Tiny Step
Forward, N.Y. TIMES, Sept. 15, 1996, § 4, at 5 (referring to Andrew Sullivan's
comment that gay marriage would be a fundamental statement of equality). See
also Andrew Sullivan, Here Comes the Groom: A Conservative Case for Gay
Marriage, NEW REPUBLIC, Aug. 28, 1989, at 20 (stating that legalizing gay
marriage "could do as much to heal the gay-straight rift as any amount of gay
rights legislation").
21 ANDREW SULLIVAN, VIRTUALLY NORMAL 179 (1995).
22 Stoddard, supra note 10, at 17.
23 ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 8. A portion of Eskridge's support for his
pro-marriage argument is sure to provoke concern about the goals of marriage,
and reinforce the myth that marriage, per se, decreases promiscuity:
Since at least the nineteenth century, gay men have been known for
their promiscuous subcultures. Promiscuity may be a consequence of
biology ... or it may be the result of acculturation. . . . In the world
of the closet, furtive behavior that is not only practically necessary but
also addictively erotic may increase the likelihood of promiscuity.
Whatever its source, sexual variety has not been liberating to gay men.
In addition to the disease costs, promiscuity has encouraged a cult of
youth worship and has contributed to the stereotype of homosexuals as
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The strongest feminist pro-marriage argument has been
articulated by Professor Nan Hunter, a critic of what she observes
to be a tendency by feminists to attribute an essential nature to
marriage. 4 By referring to marriage as patriarchal per se, rather
than critiquing marriage as a tool that reinforces patriarchy,
feminists sometimes ignore the important point that marriage is a
socially constructed institution capable of being reshaped by social
forces. As evidenced by Loving v Virginia,5 marriage is capable
of new social definitions as old views of marriage die away. Hunter
asserts that same-sex marriage holds the potential to destabilize the
gendered definition of marriage.26 Her goal, it seems, is to allow
access to marriage, not for its own sake, but for the purpose of
breaking down the gendered roles forced upon women and men
through marriage.
people who lack a serious approach to life .... A self-reflective gay
community ought to embrace marriage for its potentially civilizing
effect on young and old alike.
ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 9-10.
24 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage Pros and Cons, Address at the National Gay and
Lesbian Task Force Creating Change Conference (Nov. 1995) (on file with
Journal of Law and Policy).
25 388 U.S. 1 (1967). The Supreme Court held that a Virginia statutory
scheme prohibiting marriage based on race violated the Equal Protection and Due
Process Clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Id. at 2. The Virginia statutes
banning interracial marriage were tested by the Lovings, an interracial couple
from Virginia who married in the District of Columbia. Id. Upon return to
Virginia, the Lovings were charged and convicted of violating the state's ban on
interracial marriages. Id. at 3. The trial judge, however, suspended the jail
sentence provided that the Lovings leave the state and never return as a couple
for 25 years. Id. After eight years of court battles and appeals, the Supreme
Court found the statutes unconstitutional and reversed the convictions. Id. at 12.
26 Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAW
& SEXUALITY 9, 16 (1991). But see Nancy D. Polikoff, Symposium, We Will
Get What We Ask For: Why Legalizing Gay and Lesbian Marriage Will Not
"Dismantle the Legal Structure of Gender in Every Marriage, " 79 VA. L. REV.
1535, 1537-43 (1993) [hereinafter Polikoff, Symposium] (arguing that Hunter's
thesis is "unpersuasive" and that lesbians and gays should not make gay marriage
the focus of their movement for risk of losing sight of their aim to combat
gender hierarchies).
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B. The 4sion for Broad Family Definition
Family definition proponents, on the other hand, argue that
marriage and biological relationships are merely one form of family
and should not be the sole determinants for whether a family
receives legal privileges and benefits. Marriage holds little appeal
for this group due to its history of subordination of and ownership
over women and children, its regulation of sexuality for civilizing
purposes and its severe restrictions on gender roles." While the
meaning of and purposes for marriage have historically been
capable of change, 8 these proponents are wary of using the
"master's tools"29 to work from within.
Several other arguments inform the family definition advocates'
vision. From a feminist perspective, gender roles have been an
impervious feature of marriage for so long that it seems very
unlikely that the institution will ever change.3" Furthermore, on a
27 See Polikoff, Symposium, supra note 26, at 1536 (advocating that "the
desire to marry in the lesbian and gay community is an attempt to mimic the
worst of mainstream society, an effort to fit into an inherently problematic
institution that betrays the promise of both lesbian and gay liberation"); Cohen,
supra note 10, at 38 (urging society to promote relationships that are "positive
and rooted in equality" by engaging in political campaigns that "demand the
provision of basic rights and resources to everyone, independent of their marital
status"); see also LESBIAN AND GAY MARRIAGE, supra note 10, at 85-95
(interviewing Harry Hay and John Burnside of Los Angeles, California, a gay
couple content not to participate in mainstream marriage rituals). Despite
a 17-year relationship with her partner, Patt Denning expresses a view of
marriage not uncommon among lesbian and gay people: "People are attempting
to squeeze themselves into what I consider an abhorrent ritual, where one person
is basically made the property of the other. As much as you try to pull that ritual
apart and make it equal, it really doesn't seem equal." LESBIAN AND GAY
MARRIAGE, supra note 10, at 31 (profiling Patt Denning and Kathie Cinnater).
28 See generally JOHN BOSWELL, SAME-SEX UNIONS IN PREMODERN EUROPE
(1994); JOHN D'EMILIO & ESTELLE B. FREEDMAN, INTIMATE MATTERS: A
HISTORY OF SEXUALITY IN AMERICA (1988).
29 Use of the term "master's tools" refers to poet and writer Audre Lorde's
admonition: "The master' stools will never dismantle the master's house." AUDRE
LORDE, SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 114 (1984).
30 See generally BOSWELL, supra note 28, at 281 (referring to remarks made
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more fundamental level, it is male and female relationships
generally that are in need of degendering, not just marriage. The
extension of family recognition to unmarried couples and the
visibility of same-sex couples raising children are equally, if not
more powerfully, capable of degendering family relationships as the
extension of marriage to same-sex couples.3' Mutuality and
personal autonomy within relationships are more likely accom-
plished outside of the social strictures of marriage.32 Marriage, in
by a "well-known prelate" to Boswell that "heterosexual matrimony had become
such a ragged institution ... that it hardly constituted a useful model for same-
sex couples").
"' The core resistance of cotirts to same-sex couples becoming parents is the
fear that the children will not have an appropriate set of gendered role models.
See In re Opinion of the Justices, 530 A.2d 21, 26 (N.H. 1987). The New
Hampshire Supreme Court Justices opined that a proposed bill excluding gay
men and lesbians from foster parentage and adoption does not violate the Equal
Protection or Due Process clauses of the federal and state constitutions. Id. The
court concluded that, in the absence of a "right to adopt [or] to be a foster
parent," the bill's proposed means were "rationally related" to the bill's purpose
of providing a healthy environment and proper role models for children. Id. at
24-25. The court accepted legislative findings that living in a homosexual
environment could produce "social and psychological complexities" for children.
Id. (referring to House Resolution 70). Further, the court noted that a person's
sexual orientation is determined by a combination of genetic and environmental
factors, despite available studies indicating no connection. Id. at 25. As parents
are the primary role models after whom children pattern themselves, the court
concluded that the legislature "rationally act[ed]" in the best interest of children
by excluding gays and lesbians from adoptive or foster parent roles. Id. See also
Florida Dep't of Health & Rehabilitative Servs. v. Cox, 627 So. 2d 1210, 1214-
18 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1993) (holding that a Florida statute prohibiting adoptions
by lesbians and gay men was not unconstitutional).
32 See FRANK BROWNING, THE CULTURE OF DESIRE 87 (1993) (stating that
radical feminists who believe "men use [marriage] to reduce the personhood of
women to a status of disposable property" also accept the idea that the means by
which "we enter one another's lives and bodies should reflect common values of
equity, mutuality, and personal autonomy"); Frank Browning, Why Marry?, N.Y.
TIMES, Apr. 17, 1996, at A23 (arguing that because the institution of marriage
can be stifling and can lead to isolation, gay couples should not be too quick to
embrace marriage).
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sum, is too conservative an institution for the social goals of these
advocates.33
In addition to the problems presented by marriage per se, there
are other arguments in favor of a broader definition of family.
Mainly, marriage rights are not necessarily a priority to all lesbians
and gay men. Some believe that a basic right to a job and an end
to anti-gay violence are necessary precedents to marriage rights.34
More fundamentally, marriage does not adequately address the full
range of family relationships that equally deserve recognition.
Straight or gay, romantic or platonic, sexually monogamous or non-
monogamous, with children or without, the range of family
possibilities are endless. True choice comes from recognizing this
diversity, not in opening the door solely to lesbian and gay couples
who choose or desire to conform to a conservative norm.35
" The number of socially conservative non-gay commentators arguing for
same-sex marriage lends support to this concern. See, e.g., James P. Pinkerton,
A Conservative Argument for Gay Marriage, L.A. TIMES, June 3, 1993, at B7
(suggesting that supporting gay marriage may be helpful to the Republican Party
because "[homosexuals] are organizing, fundraising and voting"); Jonathan
Rauch, A Pro-Gay, Pro-Family Policy, WALL ST. J., Nov. 29, 1994, at A22
(urging Republicans to adopt a pro-family policy which includes all responsible
citizens, including gays and lesbians); Let Them Wed, ECONOMIST, Jan. 6-12,
1996, at 13 (arguing that gays and lesbians should be entitled to marriage
because government should not discriminate between classes of citizens, and that
gays and lesbians also need the emotional and economic security that marriage
provides). Ironically, while pointing out the conservative appeal of same-sex
marriage, some within the gay community nonetheless argue that same-sex
marriage is a component of "the progressive struggle." Gabriel Rotello, To Have
and To Hold. The Case for Gay Marriage, NATION, June 24, 1996, at 11, 18.
34 See Holmes, supra note 20, at 5 (noting that some gays and lesbians argue
that workplace equality should be the priority: "[w]ithout such rights, some say,
gay people will not be secure enough financially and psychologically to move
into the mainstream and take on issues like marriage").
" The number of couples, mostly heterosexual, who have chosen to live
together rather than marry has risen 80% between 1980 and 1991, according to
census data. Jennifer Steinhauer, No Marriage, No Apologies, N.Y. TIMES, July
6, 1995, at C1. Where employers have provided domestic partner benefits to all
of their unmarried employees, the majority of couples who have sought them are
heterosexual. Jennifer Steinhauer, Increasingly Employers Offer Benefits to All
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, Aug. 20, 1994, § 1, at 25.
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II. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
The problem in this area is not so much that lesbian and gay
couples cannot marry. Rather, it is that all of the legal and social
benefits and privileges constructed for families are available only
to those families joined by marriage or biology. Those who are not
married but function as family by caring for and supporting one
another on a daily basis receive no support for the essential role
they play. Singular pursuit of same-sex marriage serves to reinforce
the primacy of marriage in family definitions, rather than furthering
the nearly two-decade battle, often led by lesbians and gay men, to
open the door to family benefits for those who function as family
as well as for those who have formalized their relationships.
A. Absence of Recognition
The best example of the harm and indignity caused by failing
to give credence to lesbian and gay relationships is found in the
harrowing experiences of Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson,
a lesbian couple in Minnesota.36 Their saga begins with a near
fatal accident in November 1983 that left Sharon in a coma.37 In
the terrorizing hour in the hospital emergency room immediately
after the accident, Karen tried desperately to get someone to tell her
simply whether Sharon was dead or alive.38 She was coldly told,
however, that such information could only be revealed to immedi-
ate family, not to a "close friend," as Karen referred to herself.3 9
It was the intercession of a kindly priest who overheard Karen's
frantic attempts to discover Sharon's fate that brought Karen the
information she wanted: Sharon was alive, but had suffered a
36 The facts of this case are more fully recounted in KAREN THOMPSON &
JULIE ADRZEJEWSKI, WHY CAN'T SHARON KOWALSKI COME HOME? (1988). See
In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
31 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 3.
31 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 4.
19 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 4.
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severe closed head injury that would dramatically change her
life.40
Throughout the weeks following the accident, Karen spent
hours each day at Sharon's side in the hospital, talking to her,
massaging her limbs and praying for recovery.41 Confrontations
with Sharon's family, who did not understand the extreme devotion
of Sharon's "roommate" and who were resistant to Karen's desire
to assist in Sharon's treatment, ensued due to the length and
intensity of Karen's hospital visits. 42 Until that point, the nature
of Karen and Sharon's relationship was known only to a handful
of trusted friends.43 To explain herself, Karen wrote a letter to
Sharon's parents telling them of her love for Sharon and of their
lesbian relationship.44 Instead of easing tensions, the letter
prompted a hostile denial from the Kowalski family, who viewed
Karen's revelations as preposterous. 45 As tensions mounted, Karen
filed a claim to become Sharon's guardian,46 and the Kowalski's
banned her from seeing Sharon.47 What would become almost a
decade long legal battle to reunite these two women and to gain
respect for the family relationship they shared had begun.
Sharon Kowalski and Karen Thompson's experiences with the
system exposed the false predicates of family as defined by law.
Theirs was not only a story of two gay people. Central to the story
were the additional facts that Sharon was unmarried, a woman and,
now, disabled. This combination of factors allowed the courts,
hospital personnel, court appointed lawyers and friends to concede
that Sharon Kowalski, a thirty-year-old adult who no longer lived
with her parents, would forever be subject to the decisionmaking
40 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 4-5.
4 1 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 8-9.
42 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 17-18.
43 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 24.
44 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 22-25.
41 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 26. In response to Karen's
"coming out," Sharon's sister gave voice to the family sentiment: "You are a
sick, crazy person who has made up this whole story. There is no way Sharon
is a lesbian. You have written a bunch of trash. My parents never want to set
eyes on you again!" THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 26.
46 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 33.
47 THOMPSON & ADRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36, at 41.
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power of her father-legally, socially and culturally.48 Sharon's
independence, her love for and desire to see Karen and her ability
to speak for herself despite a disabling injury went unrecognized by
most of those with power over her care and her future.
Karen Thompson fought for eight years so that Sharon could be
moved from the nursing home where she languished at her family's
direction to a rehabilitation center with medical expertise in closed
head injuries. Karen fought for eight years to prove that Sharon
could still voice her wishes, and for a guardian to be appointed
who would respect those wishes and take the time to understand
Sharon's needs.49 When the Minnesota Court of Appeals finally
ruled that Karen and Sharon are a "family of affinity, which ought
to be accorded respect,"5 ° it signalled a victory for lesbian and gay
couples."
" See T. A. Tucker Ronzetti, Comment, Constituting Family and Death
Through the Struggle with State Power: Cruzan v. Director, Missouri Department
of Health, 46 U. MIAMI L. REv. 149, 182-83 (1991) (discussing In re Kowalski,
478 N.W.2d 790 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991), and explaining that Sharon Kowalski's
relationship with her father was presumptively legitimate as compared to her
relationship with Karen Thompson). Naturally, rules need to be constructed for
the care of adults unable to care for themselves. Often a parent will be the
obvious person to which the medical provider and the courts will turn. However,
once another familial relationship is asserted, procedures should allow for the
relationship to be substantiated and given preference.
'9 See Tamar Lewin, Disabled Woman's Care Given to Lesbian Partner,
N.Y. TIMES, Dec. 18, 1991, at A26. Karen Thompson fought and won the legal
battle, which began in 1984, for guardianship over her lesbian lover, Sharon
Kowalski. Id. The highly publicized legal battle became a "rallying cause for gay
rights groups" across America. Id.
'o In re Kowalski, 478 N.W.2d 790, 797 (Minn. Ct. App. 1991).
"' Upon victory, Karen Thompson's lawyer noted: "'This seems to be the
first guardianship case in the nation in which an appeals court recognized a
homosexual partner's rights as tantamount to those of a spouse."' Lewin, supra
note 49, at A26. In the author's tear-filled conversation with Karen Thompson
just hours after the court handed down its decision, Karen challenged the
perception that the case was an unequivocal victory. As she saw it, each moment
she spent battling for access to and better care for her lover was a moment lost
in Sharon's rehabilitative care-for the year and a half after a closed head injury
is apparently the most critical time period for rehabilitation. As Karen stated in
that phone conversation, "Sharon did not win here."
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Karen's battle was not one for marriage, but for respect for her
relationship with Sharon. Legal marriage probably would not have
saved Karen from the years of expensive and debilitating legal
battles she fought to retain contact with Sharon. Karen and Sharon
were desperately closeted. They married privately by exchanging
rings, and were known as a couple to only a small group of close
friends. They certainly would not have risked the public declaration
required by marriage. Yet, regardless of whether they could or
would have married, their relationship should have been accorded
greater respect, and Sharon's desire to retain contact with Karen
should have been inferred. 2 As a consequence of Karen's very
public struggle for control of her relationship with Sharon,53
lesbian couples in particular are more aware of the need to protect
themselves against family members and a judicial system that may
not always be counted on to respect lesbian and gay relation-
ships. 4
52 As one advocate has stated it, the law should be developed to "serve
lesbian relationships instead of having lesbian relationships serve the law."
Ruthann Robson, Our Relationships and Their Laws, in DYKE LIFE: FROM
GROWING UP To GROWING OLD, A CELEBRATION OF THE LESBIAN EXPERIENCE
127, 130 (Karla Jay ed., 1995).
" See generally Steven N. Hargrove, Domestic Partnership Benefits:
Redefining Family in the Workplace, 6 LOY. CONSUMER L. REP. 49, 51-52
(1994) (noting that Kowalski prompted a gradual change in the legal status of
nontraditional family arrangements by acknowledging that two lesbian women
in a committed relationship constitute a family); Arthur S. Leonard, Lesbian and
Gay Families and the Law: A Progress Report, 21 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 927, 946
(1994) (referring to Kowalski as an important case for the recognition of same-
sex couples as a family); Martha L. Minow, All in the Family & In All Families:
Membership, Loving, and Owing, 95 W. VA. L. REV. 275, 331 (1993) (stressing
that Kowalski "implicates the contemporary, unresolved questions about who is
in the family and who should be eligible for the benefits of family member-
ship").
" Karen waged a one-woman educational campaign, using her experience
to encourage lesbians, whether single or in couples, to use the legal tools
available for making their wishes known and empowering partners or friends to
assist with medical decisionmaking. See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Issues in
Health Care for Lesbians and Gay Men, 5 J. GAY & LESBIAN SOC. SERVS. 93,
94 (1996) (arguing that heterosexist assumptions about family structure require
lesbians and gay men to take overt measures to let their relationships and
decisions be known within healthcare settings); Brooke Oliver, Contracting for
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B. Absence of Benefits
The dearth of social benefits for nontraditional families is the
second factor at the core of the struggle to broaden the definition
of family. The benefits provided to family members fall into two
basic categories: (1) tangible economic benefits, either privately or
publicly provided, and (2) legal privileges.
The first category includes the range of family-oriented benefits
provided by employers which, along with salary, are part of an
employee's compensation. Healthcare benefits,55 paid bereavement
leave, parenting leave, sick leave, discounts or tuition waivers and
death benefits are among the many employer-provided benefits
extended to employees for the benefit of a spouse and children, and
are among the benefits sought by unmarried employees for their
partners under the "equal pay for equal work" rubric.
56
Cohabitation: Adapting the California Statutory Marital Contract to Life
Partnership Agreements Between Lesbian, Gay or Unmarried Heterosexual
Couples, 23 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REv. 899, 913-16 (1993) (setting forth a
checklist of rights and duties advisable to be included in life partnership
agreements between lesbian, gay and unmarried heterosexual couples in
California); Ruthann Robson & S. E. Valentine, Lov(h)ers: Lesbians as Intimate
Partners and Lesbian Legal Theory, 63 TEMP. L. REV. 511, 515-16 (1990)
(noting that Karen Thompson advocates the use of durable powers of attorney,
and other legal documentation, to protect rights of lesbian partners in times of
medical crisis).
" Employer-provided health insurance provides families, including spouses
and children, tax-free health coverage. See I.R.C. § 105(b) (West Supp. 1996)
(dealing with amounts received for medical care under accident and health plans,
including taxpayer's spouse and dependents); id. § 152 (West Supp. 1996)
(setting forth definition of dependents for purposes of receiving tax-free
employee health insurance benefits).
56 Until recently, advocacy to extend employment benefits to unmarried
partners has met with resistance in the courts. See Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp.
1062, 1069-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993) (holding that a lesbian life partner of a deceased
employee and the partner's children were not "beneficiaries" entitled to benefits
under decedent's death benefit plan, and that a provision in ERISA-covered
pension plan limiting class of eligible beneficiaries to spouses married according
to state law was not per se unreasonable or discriminatory); Hinman v. Dep't of
Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410, 419-20 (1985) (holding that denial of
dental care benefits to partners of gay or lesbian state employees does not violate
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In addition, there are other sources of tangible economic
benefits for families. Businesses and institutions provide many
family-oriented benefits to the public, such as family memberships
to museums and health clubs, frequent flier awards and discounted
family travel and home insurance coverage.17 The government
the California constitution's equal protection clause because denial was based on
statutorily defined marital status, and California has a legitimate interest in
promoting marriage); Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121,
129 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (holding that denial of family health insurance
coverage to partners of gay or lesbian state employees does not violate equal
protection clause of Wisconsin constitution since denial was based on reasonable
interpretation of marital statute as applied to state's Fair Employment Act, which
distinguishes marital status, not sexual orientation, of employees). But see
Victoria Slind-Flor, Oregon AG Weighs Gay Benefits Issue, NAT'L L.J., Sept. 2,
1996, at A8 (contemplating whether Oregon State Attorney General will appeal
finding by Multomah County Civil Court in Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences
University (docket no. 9201-00369) that Oregon Health Sciences University
discriminated against gay and lesbian employees by not extending spousal
benefits to their domestic partners); see also Judge OKs Coverage for Gays,
ROCKY MTN. NEWS, Sept. 8, 1996, at 24A (referring to Judge Stephen L.
Gallagher's recent decision in Tanner: "For the first time in the United States,
a judge has required a public agency to extend to homosexual couples the
medical, life and dental insurance benefits that married couples often have.").
Aside from a handful of private employers, city governments were early leaders
in recognizing the need to provide family benefits to unmarried workers. See
Bowman & Cornish, supra note 5, at 188-90 (noting that in 1984 Berkeley,
California passed the first domestic partnership ordinance providing employee
benefits to domestic partners of municipal employees). A number of major
private employers and universities havejoined in providing such benefits, though
many have chosen to extend them only to gay employees. See M. V. Lee
Badgett, Equal Pay for Equal Families, ACADEME, May-June 1994, at 26 (noting
that as of 1994, "[t]wenty-four colleges and universities offer healthcare benefits
to [gay and lesbian] employees' domestic partners"); David J. Jefferson, Gay
Employees Win Benefits for Partners at More Corporations, WALL ST. J., Mar.
18, 1994, at 1 (noting that as of 1994, "more than 70 major companies offer[ed]
domestic-partner benefits" limited to gay employees). But see Domestic Partner
Benefits, CENSUS OF CERTIFIED EMPLOYEE BENEFIT SPECIALISTS, (Int'l Society
of Certified Employee Benefit Specialists, Brookfield, Wis.), May 1995 (noting
that among census respondents, 44% indicated that domestic partnership benefits
are limited to same-sex partners, as opposed to a 51% indication that such
benefits are available to same-sex and unmarried, opposite-sex partners).
" Increased social consciousness and acceptance of unmarried couples has
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also provides a wide range of economic privileges to families
related by marriage or blood.5" Tax breaks, including reduced
taxes for inheritance and income tax,5 9 social security benefits,6"
inheritance rights,6 survivor's benefits upon the death of a spouse
in public service, such as police officers, firefighters and military
veterans, 62 and family medical leave63 are among the many.
The second category of social benefits for families is comprised
of the many legal privileges allowed to families joined by marriage,
led many businesses to discard the family requirement for discounts. For
example, some frequent flyer programs allow awards for "companion" travel.
Other airlines permit frequent fliers "to assign their awards to anyone they
choose regardless of relationship." Travel Advisory: Delta Air Awards for Gay
Partners, N.Y. TIMES, June 6, 1993, § 5, at 3. In 1993, Delta changed its policy
to allow gay and lesbian partners to assign awards to each other if they are
legally certified as partners by the city in which they reside. Id.; see James T.
Yenckel, Travel Options for Gays, WASH. POST, July 30, 1989, at E1 (discussing
the increasing travel options for gays and lesbians).
58 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 66-67 (listing some of the many legal
rights and benefits provided to married couples and their children).
" See generally Patricia A. Cain, Same-Sex Couples and the Federal Tax
Laws, 1 LAW & SEXUALITY 97, 99-102 (1991) (noting that none of the
specifically enacted tax benefits bestowed upon spouses married according to
state law are available to lesbian and gay couples, and arguing that the Internal
Revenue Code should be restructured to recognize the existence of lesbian and
gay families). Lesbian and gay employees who do receive partner benefits such
as healthcare discover, to their dismay, that the cost of their benefits are taxed
to them under federal law; whereas they are provided tax-free to married
employees. See supra note 55 (providing some examples of tax benefits available
to the traditional family).
60 Under the Social Security Act, married persons are entitled to survivor's
benefits. See 42 U.S.C. § 402 (1988).
6' A spouse is automatically entitled to a share of the estate of his or her
deceased spouse. See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW §§ 4-1.1, 5-1.1
(McKinney 1981 & Supp. 1996).
62 See 38 U.S.C. §§ 1310-1318 (1994) (veteran's benefits).
63 See generally 29 U.S.C.A. §§ 2601-2654 (1985 & West Supp. 1996). The
Family and Medical Leave Act provides the substantial economic benefit of
being able to return to one's job after taking time to care for, among others, an
ill spouse. Unmarried partners are not included in the law, though it appears that
the non-biological, non-adoptive parent-child relationships were covered by
Congress.
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blood or adoption.64 Spouses may seek the services of the family
court for domestic violence.65 Spouses may adopt each other's
children,66 and they may sue for the wrongful death of the
other.67 They receive preference in appointments as guardian,68
personal representative for an intestate spouse69 and for consul-
tation in medical decisionmaking.7 ° Legally recognized parents are
also allowed the privilege of custody and visitation" and the right
to notice before the child may be adopted.72 Legally recognized
spouses and children also receive preferential treatment for
immigration.73
Both social recognition that a relationship is one that falls under
the umbrella of family, and recognition that tangible family benefits
and privileges should thereby attach to such relationships, are
central to the functioning and well-being of family units. It is the
desire and need for this basic social support that motivates lesbian
and gay family advocates to open access to these benefits. As the
Sharon Kowalski case illustrates, however, focusing solely on
marriage as the means to do so will assist only those families
joined by marriage. Those who have not married, regardless of the
reason, should not be penalized for their decision; and their
decision not to marry should not be interpreted as a lack of
commitment. We need only look at the present in order to predict
64 There are also unofficial privileges associated with marriage, such as
admittance to an intensive care unit to visit with an ill partner, access to fertility
clinics for reproductive services, attendance at the birth of a child or preference
for sharing a room in a nursing home.
65 New York's domestic relations law provides that spouses may seek court
orders and other services through the family court, which is better equipped to
handle family violence than the criminal court. See N.Y. FAM. CT. ACT § 812(1),
(5) (McKinney 1990 & Supp. 1996).
66 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 110 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
67 See N.Y. EST. POWERS & TRUSTS LAW § 5-4.1 to 4.4.
68 See id. § 5-1.1 (right of election by surviving spouse).
69 See id.
70 See N.Y. PUB. HEALTH LAW § 2981(3)(d) (McKinney 1993 & Supp.
1996) (stating that "[n]o person who is not the spouse, child, parent, brother,
sister or grandparent of the principal" may be appointed "healthcare agent").
71 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 70 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
72 See id § 111 (McKinney 1988 & Supp. 1996).
71 See 8 U.S.C. §§ 1151(b)(2)(A)(i), 1430(a)-(b), (d) (1994).
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the future. Most private domestic partner benefits policies are
extended only to gay and lesbian employees, on the grounds that
they could not marry in order to get the benefits.74 Unmarried
straight couples are left without benefits. Once marriage is
available, gay and lesbian couples will most certainly be required
to marry in order to receive benefits. Gay couples, like straight
couples now, will be forced to marry in order to get the benefits.
Those who are not married would once again struggle without
healthcare, bereavement leave and all of the other workplace
benefits finally extended to unmarried workers. One step forward,
two steps back.
III. THE ARGUMENT FOR THE FAMILY DEFINITION APPROACH TO
FAMILY RECOGNITION
Challenging marriage laws to include lesbian and gay couples
was a choice that advocates could have made to extend the
privileges of family to lesbian and gay couples. Most of these
advocates, having been informed by the feminist and gay liberation
movements and the progressive politics of narrowing the gap
between the "haves" and the "have-nots," chose instead to use their
marginal status as lesbians and gay men to broaden the definition
of family and to challenge the role of marriage in disbursing such
necessary benefits as healthcare. These advocates drew on the fact
that most people define familial caretaking networks well beyond
marriage and biology." Gay families were not the first to advo-
cate for functional definitions of family,76 but their existence on
74 See, e.g., Dunlap, supra note 13, at A 18 (describing IBM's newly enacted
domestic partnership policy).
" Most people instinctively define family beyond marriage and blood
relationships. A 1989 poll of 1200 adults nationwide revealed that 74% defined
family as a group of people who love and care for each other, while only 22%
said a family was a group of people related by blood, marriage or adoption.
Survey Reveals Role of Family in American Life, PR NEWSWIRE, Oct. 10, 1989,
available in LEXIS, News Library, Prnews File.
76 The concept of functional parenthood has been examined by courts
addressing the visitation or custody rights of step-parents or other extended
family members. See, e.g., Bryan v. Bryan, 645 P.2d 1267, 1273 (Ala. Ct. App.
1982) (visitation granted to stepfather); Collins v. Gilbreath, 403 N.E.2d 921,
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the periphery of marriage provided compelling grounds for
questioning the policy of extending economic benefits and legal
privileges to only marital and blood family members. In this effort,
marriage becomes but one form of family, joining other relation-
ships, such as functional families," domestic partnerships" and
co-parents under the umbrella of family.
Four premises have fueled the movement for broader definitions
of family. First, cultural views of family already include relation-
ships not bound by marriage or biology that should be given legal
effect. Second, extension of critical economic and legal benefits to
only a narrow group of legally defined family is discriminatory and
interferes with strong public policy goals of supporting families.
923 (Ind. Ct. App. 1980) (stepfathergranted visitation while biological father had
custody); Atkinson v. Atkinson, 408 N.W.2d 516, 519 (Mich. Ct. App. 1987)
(developing theory of "equitable parenthood" to protect parental expectations of
man who discovered at divorce that he was not the child's biological father); In
re D.M.M., 404 N.W.2d 530, 536-37 (Wis. 1987) (aunt granted parental standing
as functional parent despite statutes limitation to parents and grandparents).
Though the California case of Marvin v. Marvin was not a family definition case
per se, it certainly broke ground at the time for allowing an unmarried partner
to make a claim for spousal support by proving an implied or express contract
to provide for her well-being after the break up of the relationship. 557 P.2d 106,
113 (Cal. 1976).
7' The functional family form is applicable to any group of people who care
for each other. But, finding that the group is a functional family in some contexts
does not necessarily mean that they must be so designated in all contexts. For
example, two elderly friends who live together for economic and companionship
reasons may be considered each other's family for the limited purposes of
hospital visitation, landlord-tenant relationships or medical decisionmaking,
because they are likely to know more about each other's needs than blood family
who may be hours away. Depending on the circumstances and the extent of their
family, however, it may not be appropriate to extend to them the complete range
of family benefits. See, e.g., Baer v. Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 942, 537
N.E.2d 619, 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (1989) (finding members of group
home not related by blood, adoption or marriage considered to be functional
family for purposes of zoning ordinance); McMinn v. Oyster Bay, 66 N.Y.2d
544, 551, 488 N.E.2d 1240, 1244, 498 N.Y.S.2d 128, 132 (1985) (holding
unconstitutional the definition of family in zoning ordinance limiting the age of
unrelated persons who could dwell in a single-family home pursuant to due
process clause of state constitution).
78 See supra note 7 (defining "domestic partnership").
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Third, insofar as government controls the benefits and legal rights
of family, function, not morality, should govern family definitions
and legal access to such benefits. Fourth, the traditional marriage
model of two-person couples and their children is inadequate to
meet the needs of the growing number of families within the
lesbian and gay community.
A. Cultural Inclusion As Family
The idea that family exists beyond marriage and blood certainly
pre-existed the work of lesbian and gay family advocates. 79
Through the stories of Karen Thompson, Miguel Braschi8° and
numerous gay couples raising children, the public has been
confronted with the unfairness of a system that did not give credit
to their relationships. Employers' restructuring of employment
benefits and courts' willingness to extend equal parental status to
two women raising children together have proven that solutions can
be found to ease the disparity between families. But, the point of
these stories and solutions was not to require that all get married.
To the contrary, the point was to uncover solutions for families
who do not fit within the laws and policies defining family
relationships as requiring marriage or biology. To accomplish their
goal of including lesbians and gay men within the definition of
family, advocates culled the essence of what it means to be family
by emphasizing its many functions. They created terminology to
accurately describe the function and, eventually, to serve as terms
of art which, much like the term spouse, would become universally
understood. Terms like "domestic partner" and "second parent
adoption" allow one to readily visualize the family relationships at
issue.
Most of the functional characteristics of family were easily
identifiable: emotional interdependence, commitment to the long
79 See DizARD & GADLIN, supra note 3, at 7 (noting that citizens were
encouraged to value both community and family in colonial America).
80 Referring to the plaintiff in Braschi v. Stahl Assocs. who challenged his
landlord's attempt to evict him after his gay lover died. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543
N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 790 (1989). See infra notes 90-96, 106-14 (discussing
the Braschi case).
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term, caretaking and responsibility for each other's well-being and
some financial intermingling, all of which are meant to distinguish
family members from roommates. For the most part, cohabitation
is required, or at least helpful, to establish a family relationship.8
The weight given to any particular family function usually
correlates to the benefit or privilege sought. Cohabitation, for
example, may not be an expendable element in a case in which
one's home is the center of controversy.
Many of the terms developed to describe lesbian and gay family
relationships, such as "domestic partnership," have become both
part of the culture's vernacular and terms of art within the law.
While many terms may very well have pre-existed lesbian and gay
family advocacy, most have taken a more definite form with the
visibility of lesbian and gay relationships. Generically, families not
joined by marriage or blood are referred to as alternative,82
8 Some argue, however, that the emphasis on family functions such as
cohabitation fails to reflect the broader family networks that many lesbians and
gay men have formed with friends in response to cultural alienation, hostility and
estrangement from blood family members who refuse to accept a gay family
member. See BROWNING, supra note 32, at 134-59 (suggesting that the gay
family, most of which have substituted friends for blood relations, will have
deeper meaning if it moves from a bond of private affection to one posed in
civic participation); KATH WESTON, FAMILIES WE CHOOSE 202-13 (1991)
(arguing that marriage does not adequately define lesbian and gay relationships
and will not satisfy the need for social recognition and state administered
benefits); see also Duggan, supra note 10, at 5 (arguing that assumptions about
marriage and family-that "a sexual relationship is the basis for a household, that
reproduction takes place through such relationships, that economic dependence
and property transmission is best structured through such household"-fail to
define the way gay men and lesbians actually live). In the author's experience,
universities have been most sympathetic to loosening the cohabitation require-
ment for receipt of domestic partner benefits because they constantly confront the
dilemmas of spouses who have committed relationships because one of them
could not find suitable employment in a college town. Ironically, some have
suggested dropping the cohabitation requirement in, of all things, domestic
partnership. See Bowman & Cornish, supra note 5, at 1204-05 (commenting that
the requirement of cohabitation to establish a domestic partnership may exclude
those who are truly committed to one another).
82 Barbara J. Cox, Alternative Families: Obtaining Traditional Family
Benefits Through Litigation, Legislation, and Collective Bargaining, 2 WISC.
WOMEN'S L.J. 1, 3 (1986). Alternative families involve committed relationships
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functional 3 or nontraditional families. Individuals in couples may
call themselves "family partners, 814 companions," "life part-
ners"86 or "domestic partners, 8 17 the term most commonly used.
Some lesbians and gay men take on the term "spouse" to best
describe their relationship. To distinguish the relationship between
between unmarried heterosexual or homosexual couples and their dependent
children. Id. at 3-4 & n.8.
" Note, Looking for a Family Resemblance: The Limits of the Fundamental
Approach to the Legal Definition of Family, 104 HARV. L. REV. 1640, 1646-47
(1991).
[T]he functional approach [to family] inquires whether a relationship
shares the essential characteristics of a traditionally accepted relation-
ship and fulfills the same human needs. Thus, the specific charac-
teristics of each relationship, such as economic cooperation, partici-
pation in domestic responsibilities, and affection between the parties,
play a crucial role in a functional determination of family status....
Courts that apply functionalism are generally less deferential to the
legislature and believe that they should expand the definition of family
to incorporate social changes and keep pace with "the needs of the
country." For functionalist courts, the value of marriage and parent-
hood derives from positive societal effects, such as encouragement of
stable, affectionate, and economically efficient human relationships.
Id.
84 See, e.g., Hinman v. Departmentof Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410,
412 (Ct. App. 1985) (identifying Hinman's gay partner as his "mate," "spouse"
or "family partner").
85 See, e.g., Phillips v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121, 123
(Wis. Ct. App. 1992) (noting that dependent insurance coverage is not available
to "companions" of unmarried state employees).
86 See, e.g., Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 212, 543 N.E.2d 49,
55, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784, 790 (1989) (noting that "[t]he determination as to whether
an individual is entitled to non-eviction protection should be based upon an
objective examination of the relationship of the parties" and that the gay "life
partner" of tenant in rent-controlled apartment should have been given an
opportunity to prove that he was a member of tenant's family).
87 Beyond simply cultural status, domestic partnership has reached legal
status through the adoption of many city and county ordinances across the
country which provide employment benefits, such as health insurance and
bereavement leave, to the domestic partners of government employees. See
generally Bownan & Cornish, supra note 5, at 1188-1203 (identifying the cities
which have such ordinances as of 1992 and discussing the common threads that
run between them).
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the biological mother and her partner who is raising children with
her, the terms co-parent 8 and second parent89 were coined
specifically as non-gendered terms that reflect the experiences of
lesbian couples who raise children.
Accepting a cultural view of family as individuals who are
emotionally and financially interdependent, the New York Court of
Appeals became the first to legally define family to include a gay
couple. In Braschi v Stahl Associates,9" two gay men, Leslie
Blanchard and Miguel Braschi, had shared ten years of their lives
together in Blanchard's rent-controlled apartment. 91  After
Blanchard's death, the landlord attempted to evict Braschi on the
grounds that the rent control regulations allow only family
members to remain in the apartment after the death of the
tenant.92 Braschi fought the eviction, and convinced the court of
" See generally Paula L. Ettelbrick, Who Is A Parent?: The Need To
Develop a Lesbian Conscious Family Law, 10 N.Y.L. SCH. J. HUM. RTS. 513
(1993) [hereinafter Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?] (discussing judicial treatment
and future implications of"lesbian co-parents"); Polikoff, RedefiningParenthood,
supra note 6 (using term "co-parent" to refer generally to the biological mother's
lesbian partner who functions equally as the child's parent). "Co-parent adoptions
involve the attempt by the life partner of the biological parent to adopt the child
so that the child is part of a family with two parents." William E. Adams, Whose
Family is it Anyway? The Continuing Struggle for Lesbians and Gay Men
Seeking to Adopt Children, 30 NEW ENG. L. REV. 579, 590 (1996).
'9 Aside from distinguishing between two lesbian mothers, the term second
parent also distinguishes an unmarried co-parent from a step-parent, a term which
presupposes a marriage between a parent and her partner. See, e.g., In re
Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., 666 A.2d 535, 538 (N.J. Super. Ct. App.
Div. 1995) ("As we understand the trial judge's reasoning, he was of the view
that since the plaintiff was not the legal spouse of the natural mother, she could
not qualify as a stepparent and, consequently, her adoption petition could not be
granted .... ."). In Adoption of Two Children by H.N.R., the appellate division
held that the statutory requirement of marriage attached to the term "stepparent"
should not be "narrowly interpreted so as to defeat an adoption that is clearly in
the child's best interests" and, consequently, allowed the adoption labelling the
natural mother's adoptive lesbian partner as the child's "second parent" instead
of "stepparent." Id. at 539.
90 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
9' Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50-5 1, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785-86.
92 Id. The rent control regulation extended "non-eviction protection" to the
"surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member of the deceased
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appeals that gay couples (who are financially and emotionally
interdependent) are family members for purposes of the rent control
law.93
To reach its decision, the court examined family from a cultural
perspective, referring to family alternately as "a group of people
united by certain convictions or common affiliation" and a
"collective body of persons who live in one house under one head
or management."94 The court rejected the view that family must
be "rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their
relationships by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or
adoption order., 95 Rather, the court looked at the cultural and
functional aspect of family that does not "rest on fictitious legal
distinctions or genetic history, but instead should find its foundation
in the reality of family life.",96
Though extension of Braschi to other family contexts has
proved to be quite limited, the court's inclusion of lesbian and gay
couples within the definition of family was an historical step
toward creating a lesbian and gay-inclusive cultural view of family.
Marriage was not, and should not be, the determining factor in
whether rent control occupants may stay in their homes after the
person with whom they have shared that home as a family dies.
The New Jersey Supreme Court recently looked to the cultural
indicia of family to allow recovery for emotional distress damages
by a woman who witnessed the accidental death of her fiancd.
Ruling that Eileen Dunphy had a "familial relationship" with her
fianc6, the court in Dunphy v Gregor97 extended recovery for the
common law tort of bystander liability beyond the limits of blood
and legal family members.98 As in Braschi, the Dunphy court
tenant's family who has been living with the tenant." Id. at 209, 543 N.E.2d at
52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787.
9' Id. at 213-14, 543 N.E.2d at 55, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 790.
94 Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789 (citing BLACK'S LAW
DICTIONARY 543 (Special Deluxe 5th ed. 1979); WEBSTER'S NINTH NEW
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 448 (1984)).
95 Id.
96 Id.
9' 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
9' Id at 376.
FAMILY RECOGNITION
emphasized the components of the couple's lives that served as the
indicia of family: cohabitation, shared finances and a long-term
commitment, as evidenced by their intention to marry.99 Reflecting
upon the practical interpretive posture of the Braschi decision, the
Dunphy court expressed its confidence that "courts are capable of
dealing with the realities, not simply the legalities, of relationships
to assure that resulting emotional injury is genuine and deserving
of compensation." 0
Parenting cases have long been fertile ground for exploring the
contours of functional family definitions. Most notably, due to the
limitations on reproduction for same-sex partners, the experiences
of lesbian and gay parents have challenged the parameters of
parenthood. For lesbians, specifically, the couple decides which of
them will bear or adopt the child.0  Should the couple break up,
the question is whether the non-biological/non-adoptive parent has
a legal claim to visitation or custody as a functional parent to the
child. Advocates have argued that the assumption of responsibility
and caretaking incurred by the co-parent, and the clear intent of the
parties at the time of conception or adoption to raise the child as
co-equal parents, form the basis for a claim of parental rights by
the non-legal parent.0 2 Courts, initially unwilling to grapple with
the absence of a bright line rule, have gradually moved toward
following the cultural view that parenthood is an active function,
not just a status.13
" Id. at 378. While the betrothal between the plaintiff and her fiancd assisted
the court's finding of a long-term commitment, nothing in the court's reasoning
indicates that the intent to marry is dispositive of its ruling.
100 Id.
'0o See Deborah Lashman, Second Parent Adoption: A Personal Perspective,
2 DuKE J. ON GENDER L. & POL'Y 227 (1995) (noting a lesbian couple who
decided that one partner will bear their children using alternative insemination
with an anonymous donor); Ann Pressley & Nancy Andrews, For Gay Couples,
The Nursery Becomes the New Frontier, WASH. POST., Dec. 20, 1992, Al
(detailing one gay couple's efforts to have two children through the artificial
insemination of two surrogate mothers).
02 See Ettelbrick, Who is a Parent?, supra note 88, at 548 n. 176 (discussing
the standard set forth by NOW Legal Defense and Education Fund as amicus
curiae in Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991)).
103 See infra notes 121-55 and accompanying text (discussing parental status
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In addition, the mere acts of including lesbian and gay lives
into the definition of family and attaching names to lesbian and gay
family relationships have helped to shift the focus from the purely
sexual to the familial. The terms "domestic partner" and "second
parent," with their emphasis on familial relationships, highlight the
broader experiences of lesbian and gay lives and lessen the degree
of sexual stigma that has long justified the mistreatment of lesbian
and gay families." 4
To the extent that love and commitment form the basis of
family from a cultural view, lesbians and gay men are equally
capable of fulfilling the functional role of family. Family definition
advocates have successfully shifted society's view of lesbians and
gay men from an emphasis solely on the sexual aspects of their
relationships to an acceptance of their familial bonds.
B. Public Policy Goals
Assume for a moment that a genuine social commitment to
supporting families and reinforcing their ability to care for each
other exists. What would it look like? Perhaps the commitment
would be realized by allowing families to keep some of their tax
dollars to pay for new winter coats, a vacation or college tuition;
by ensuring that couples can, after years of pooling assets, plan for
their old age, assured that pensions and social security benefits will
be available to each of them should the other die first; by providing
health insurance to each family member and the right to return to
his or her job after caring for an ill family member; or by allowing
access to each other in hospitals or prisons, and the dignity inherent
in respecting their decisions in the most intimate of family matters,
such as bearing and raising children, making medical decisions,
terminating life support and handling funeral arrangements.
and its relation to the best interests of the child).
104 See Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107 (Va. 1995) (upholding a
ruling taking a child away from his lesbian mother because of her sexual
relationship with her domestic partner); see also Julie Shapiro, Custody and
Conduct: How the Law Fails Lesbian and Gay Parents and Their Children, 71
IND. L.J. 623, 650-54 (1996) (discussing "judicial concerns regarding gender
roles, sexual identity, and social stigma") (emphasis added).
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This commitment to family might also secure the parent-child
interests of those with no formalized relationship. If the strongest
of public policy goals is to support families, and if these are just a
handful of the ways in which that could be accomplished, is there
any justification for allowing only those families joined by
marriage, or only those families biologically joined, to partake in
economic and social support?
Perhaps the most dramatic impact of the work of family
definition advocates has been their questioning of the policy
justifications for providing these kinds of economic and social
benefits to marital and blood families while denying them to
functional families. How is the need to care for an ill partner any
less important, to both the family members and to society, than the
need to care for an ill spouse? How do unmarried couples have less
of a need than married couples to save on their tax burden in order
to buy their children winter coats? Why would courts assume that
a child's functional relationship with the biological parent's partner,
who also cares for and raises the child, is meaningless as compared
to the child's relationship with the biological parent?
By asking these questions and examining the policy goals
underlying the laws and regulations that impact on families, family
definition advocates have gradually, but steadily, challenged the
government and private industry to treat people who share in the
burden of caring for each other, whether married or not, equally.
They ask whether there is a legitimate justification for denying such
fundamental economic and social support to families not joined by
marriage or other formal indicia of family."0 5 As long as legally
recognized family status is the gateway to benefits and privileges,
the question must be asked whether the policy goal for providing
the benefit is furthered or diminished by allowing access only to
married or biological family members. Access to benefits and
privileges should be guided by a desire to fulfill the purpose for
which those benefits are provided, not by rigid definitions of
family.
105 In contrast, same-sex marriage advocates ask only whether there is a
justification for denying marriage to lesbian and gay couples, never questioning
the legitimacy of privileging marital relationships over other family relationships.
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Again, the decisions in Braschi v Stahl Associates10 6 and
Dunphy v Gregor"0 7 serve as excellent examples of this process.
In Braschi, the court was asked to fully examine the legislative
history and policy underlying the rent control law in New York
City."0 8 The regulation extended protection against evictions to
the "surviving spouse of the deceased tenant or some other member
of the deceased tenant v family who has been living with the tenant
[of record]."'0 9 After the death of his longtime gay partner with
whom he had lived and under whose name the apartment was
leased, Miguel Braschi faced eviction because he did not qualify as
a member of his deceased partner's "family" according to the rent
control regulation."0
For years, landlords and tenants alike doubtlessly assumed that
the term "member of the deceased tenant's family" applied to so-
called traditional family members: spouses, biological or adopted
children and grandchildren, perhaps siblings, aunts, uncles and
cousins. By 1986, the year Mr. Braschi's longtime partner had died,
lesbian and gay couples had become increasingly more visible and
had found growing social acceptance due, in part, to publicity
surrounding gay men who cared for their lovers as they died of
AIDS and lesbians having children in unprecedented numbers.
These, and many other factors, prompted functional family
106 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784 (1989).
107 642 A.2d 372 (N.J. 1994).
'0' Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785
(referring to New York City Rent and Eviction Regulations, N.Y. COMP. CODES
R. & REGS. tit. 9, § 2204.6(d)). As the court noted, the rent control law was a
post-World War II measure designed to address the severe housing shortage that
resulted in "speculative, unwarranted and abnormal increases in rents" and to
prevent "profiteering, speculation and other disruptive practices tending to
produce threats to public health ... [and] to prevent uncertainty, hardship and
dislocation." Id. at 208, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 787. In order to fully
protect tenants, the legislature determined that rents would have to be controlled
and evictions would have to be regulated. Id. at 209, 543 N.E.2d at 52, 544
N.Y.S.2d at 787. To accomplish both tasks, the legislature adopted regulations
that, among other provisions, anticipated situations in which the named tenant on
the lease had died or otherwise vacated the apartment leaving family members
behind. Id.
'09 Id. at 206, 543 N.E.2d at 50, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 785 (emphasis added).
110 Id.
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advocates to take Mr. Braschi's case to the state's highest court in
order to deliberate on the meaning of the term "family.'
The court allowed legislative history and intent to guide its
decision regarding the definition of family. Grounding its definition
in the "realit[ies] of family life," the court found that "the
Legislature intended to extend protection to those who reside in
households having all of the normal familial characteristics.""' 2
To that end, the court further noted that family should not "be
rigidly restricted to those people who have formalized their
relationship by obtaining, for instance, a marriage certificate or an
adoption order.""' 3 For purposes of the rent control law, a "more
realistic, and certainly equally valid, view of a family" includes
unmarried partners in committed, long-term relationships." 4
The greater policy goal of the rent control law simply cannot
be accomplished by protecting only those who are married. The
harshness and unfairness of adhering to a definition of family
limited to biology or marriage in the rent control context is self-
evident. Mr. Braschi, who had lived in the apartment for ten years,
would have been evicted from his home only because of the
uncontrollable event of the death of his partner. To be sure, the fact
that the couple could not legally marry appealed to the court's
sympathy. The equally significant aspect of the ruling, however, is
the clear injustice that the court found in requiring marriage to a
deceased partner as a condition to the retention of one's own home.
... The Braschi case was far from the first case to question the definition of
the term "family." See, e.g., Athineos v. Thayer, 153 A.D.2d 825, 826, 545
N.Y.S.2d 337, 338 (2d Dep't 1989) (holding an orphan living with a family most
of her life, without having been formally adopted, to be a "family member"
under New York City's rent control laws); 2-4 Realty Assocs. v. Pittman, 137
Misc. 2d 898, 907, 523 N.Y.S.2d 7, 12 (Civ. Ct. 1987) (expanding the definition
of "family" to include a 25-year landlord-boarder relationship that evolved into
a father-son relationship). It was, however, the first case to reach New York's
highest court, and certainly is a groundbreaking case for the proposition that
lesbian and gay couples can have legally recognized family relationships.
112 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
... Id The legislature's intention to prevent against sudden eviction of rent
control occupants "should not rest on fictitious legal distinctions or genetic
history." Id.
114 Id.
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With a less developed family policy examination, the New
Jersey Supreme Court in Dunphy decided that there was little
rational distinction between a woman who witnessed the accidental
death of her husband and a woman who witnessed the accidental
death of her fianc&d. 5 The horror and emotional distress experi-
enced by the fianc6 could hardly be quantified as less than that
which a spouse would suffer. Thus, common law tort liability to a
bystander who shared a "familial relationship" with the deceased
equally covers one who shared a functional relationship with the
deceased. The award of emotional distress damages to family
members who witness the death of a loved one, therefore, is a
direct acknowledgment of the value of that relationship.
Both Braschi and Dunphy illustrate the greatest advantage and
benefit of pursuing recognition of lesbian and gay families from the
functional perspective. These cases promote an examination of the
purpose for which the law was adopted and ask whether adhering
to formalized definitions of family furthers or obstructs the law's
goals. In so doing, the courts paved the way for many types of
families to receive long overdue support.
Although courts have been slow in interpreting family terms
according to function, domestic partnership has become a very
important means of challenging the mechanical way in which
married couples are unjustly privileged over those who are
unmarried. Domestic partnership is first and foremost a workplace
concept." 6 It establishes a civil rights remedy to the pervasive
" Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (N.J. 1994). "The specific issue
presented [in Dunphy] is whether bystander liability allows recovery by a person
who was not legally married to a deceased victim but who cohabited with and
was engaged to marry the decedent." Id. at 373. The New Jersey Supreme Court
concluded that "an unmarried cohabitant should be afforded the protections of
bystander liability for the negligent infliction of emotional injury ... [based on]
the existence of an intimate familial relationship with the victim of the
defendant's negligence." Id. at 380 (emphasis added). Describing a "familial
relationship" as "a relationship that is deep, enduring, and intimate," the court
found the fiancd in Dunphy to be in such a relationship with the decedent even
absent marriage. Id. at 377-78.
'16 Some marriage advocates have unfairly maligned domestic partnership as
creating a "second class citizenship." See Sullivan, supra note 20, at 20; Wolfson,
supra note 17, at 606-07. Those who receive health benefits, bereavement leave
FAMILY RECOGNITION
practice of disproportionately providing married employees with
health insurance, paid bereavement, family sick leave and other
"family" based benefits that are denied to unmarried employees and
their families. Its main premise is that unmarried workers who
perform the same jobs, at the same salaries as married workers,
should be entitled to "equal pay for equal work... 7
Employers who have extended domestic partner benefits to
unmarried couples have done so for two primary reasons. First, the
change in policy was a necessary response to the reality of their
employees' lives. Bereavement leave policies allowing an employee
and family sick leave as domestic partners receive the same benefits as their
married counterparts. Far from being second classed, they are paid equally. Those
whose relationships are given full recognition with regard to rent-controlled
apartments and parenting options are treated equally. Granted, the unfortunate
attempt by some citizens to lend some form of government recognition to
unmarried couples through domestic partnership ordinances, which allow
unmarried city residents to register their non-marital relationship, has confused
and disillusioned many who register only to find that, unless they are a city
employee, they receive little in the way of benefits. This one glitch, however,
should not be used by marriage advocates to undermine the vibrant movement
to treat employees and others in domestic partnerships equally, despite the
absence of a marriage license.
"'? "Equal pay for equal work" is a concept that came out of the feminist
movement's exposure of the ways in which women, who performed the same or
similar job functions as men, were chronically underpaid. It is legally encapsu-
lated in the Federal Equal Pay Act. See 29 U.S.C. § 206(d) (1994) (guaranteeing
equal pay for men and women performing substantially equal work). Courts have
not generally been receptive to claims of discrimination in this area. See Hinman
v. Department of Personnel Admin., 213 Cal. Rptr. 410 (Ct. App. 1985); Phillips
v. Wisconsin Personnel Comm'n, 482 N.W.2d 121 (Wis. Ct. App. 1992). But see
Tanner v. Oregon Health Sciences Univ., No. 9201-00369 (Or. Civ. Ct. Aug. 8,
1996) (allowing plaintiffs to proceed with claim of discrimination in denial of
domestic partner benefits); Slind-Flor, supra note 56, at A8 (reporting on Tanner
decision). For the most part, legal challenges have been abandoned in favor of
negotiating strategies by employees and unions. As the case of Rovira v. AT&T
illustrates, it is virtually impossible to legally challenge private employers whose
duties with regard to benefits are governed by the Employee Retirement and
Income Security Act ("ER1SA"). See 760 F. Supp. 376 (S.D.N.Y. 1991). Insofar
as neither ERISA nor federal civil rights laws ban marital or sexual orientation
discrimination in employment, the law does not disallow such inequitable
treatment.
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paid time for the death of a spouse or a spouse's parent, but not for
a partner, partner's parent or even a best friend, seem insensitive
to the human needs of employees. The loss of a long-term partner
is no less traumatic than the loss of a spouse. Second, failure to
extend such benefits, for many employers, undermines their own
commitment to equal treatment in the workplace. Thousands of
employers have adopted internal policies prohibiting sexual
orientation and marital status discrimination,"1 8 even where the
law has not required them to do so. Additionally, in response to
domestic partner advocates, many of these employers have extended
this commitment to the area of benefits." 9
Domestic partnership has had a powerful social impact. It has
raised the visibility of non-marital relationships, in particular, those
of lesbian and gay couples. 20 It has created an identifiable third
social category of family: people who are neither married nor
single. And, it has allowed advocates a means for challenging the
'18 See Rovira v. AT&T, 817 F. Supp. 1062, 1069-72 (S.D.N.Y. 1993)
(holding that employer's sexual orientation and marital status non-discrimination
policy not enforceable under ERISA).
"' See Dunlap, supra note 13, at A18 (reporting on IBM's newly enacted
domestic partner benefit policy). New York City, San Francisco, Seattle and
Boston are some of the larger cities that have followed the lead of Berkeley,
California, in extending domestic partner benefits to city employees. See
Bowman & Cornish, supra note 5, at 1188 (enumerating the municipalities that
have enacted domestic partnership ordinances or extended certain partnership
benefits to employees).
'20 The mere existence of domestic partnership has allowed commentators
who are not yet ready to accept same-sex marriage the opportunity to argue for
a viable alternative. See William Safire, Same-Sex Marriage Nears, N.Y. TIMES,
Apr. 29, 1996, at A27 (advocating that lesbian and gay domestic partners should
be granted all the benefits of marriage, but that marriage should remain a union
between a man and a woman). They Needn't Be Called 'Marriage,' But Gay
Unions Merit Legal Status, BUFFALO NEWS, May 20, 1996, at 2B (noting that
lesbian and gay couples should be given all benefits except adoption). The
extension of domestic partner benefits to only lesbian and gay couples is a
troubling trend. The primary purpose of the remedy is to recognize the range of
family relationships that are denied costly economic employment benefits.
Extending benefits to only gay or lesbian couples on the theory that they should
receive them because they cannot legally marry reinforces the central role of
marriage in family benefits: one receives the benefits only if one is married or
legally prohibited from marrying.
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denial of important economic benefits, particularly in the work-
place, to those who are sharing a life with a partner to whom they
are not married.
Family definition advocacy has promoted more flexible and
meaningful views of parent-child relationships as well. The best
interests of children, the standard by which family law decisions
about children are made, are much better served by adopting a
functional approach to family, rather than holding rigidly to formal
definitions of parent-child relationships as defined by marriage or
biology. The focus on functional roles of parents forces courts to
more fully examine both the essence of parenthood and the policy
directive to decide cases which are in the children's best inter-
ests."' Rather than simply matching a biological or adopted child
with her biological or adopted parent, courts must be allowed to
consider the active role of parenting proposed by the functional
model if the policy goal of promoting the child's best interest is to
be truly realized.
In custody and visitation cases, this approach has found favor
with many courts where the functional parent is a step-parent,
grandparent or other extended family member.' When the
functional parent is a lesbian or gay man, however, judges' first
inclination has often been to retreat to strict interpretations of the
121 See generally Katharine T. Bartlett, Rethinking Parenthood as an
Exclusive Status: The Need for Legal Alternatives When the Premise of the
Nuclear Family Has Failed, 70 VA. L. REv. 879 (1984) (emphasizing that the
caretaking role of parents to decide custody cases gives courts a clearer direction
in both the formal cases of divorce and custody determinations for biological
children, and in the functional family cases where one parent's relationship is
based solely on performance of the functional role as a parent).
22 Several New York courts have allowed parental status to individuals
functioning as parents. See, e.g., Taylor v. Alger, 129 Misc. 2d 1054, 1055, 495
N.Y.S.2d 120, 121 (Fam. Ct. 1985) (granting standing to step-great-grandfather);
Trapp v. Trapp, 126 Misc. 2d 30, 30, 480 N.Y.S.2d 979, 979 (Fam. Ct. 1984)
(granting standing to stepfather); Humphrey v. Humphrey, 103 Misc. 2d 175,
178, 425 N.Y.S.2d 759, 761 (Fam. Ct. 1980) (granting grandparents standing to
seek custody when the "petition shows patently that the welfare of the child may
require it"); In re Lutz' Estate, 201 Misc. 539, 543, 107 N.Y.S.2d 388, 392 (Sur.
Ct. 1951) (holding that a blood relationship between the parties is not necessary
to establish a parent-child relationship).
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term "parent." Two decisions from New York and Wisconsin's
highest courts provide classic examples of this retreat and illustrate
the need to keep pushing courts to adopt a functional analysis of
parenthood in appropriate cases as the only sure way to secure full
consideration of children's interests. 23
In Alison D. v Virginia M,124 the court mechanically deter-
mined that Alison, as a "biological stranger" to the child she helped
raise from birth with her former partner, had no claim to visita-
tion.125 With no discussion of the goal of furthering the child's
best interests, of the lower court cases adopting a functional
approach to determining "parental status"'126 or of an acknowl-
edgement of the nontraditional family setting in which many
123 E.g., Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569
N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991); In re Z.J.H., 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991). Each case
involved long-term lesbian couples who had ended their relationships and were
battling over custody or visitation of their children. Each case presented the
question of whether the non-biological or non-adoptive mother had standing to
seek either visitation or custody. In each, the courts had previously adopted
functional familial definitions, only to either inexplicably ignore the prior ruling,
as the New York Court of Appeals did, or to make tortured distinctions, as did
the Wisconsin Supreme Court.
124 77 N.Y.2d 651, 572 N.E.2d 27, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586 (1991).
125 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 654-55, 572 N.E.2d at 28, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 587.
126 For authorities setting forth criteria to determine whether a person is
entitled to in loco parentis status under New York law, see People v. Lilly, 71
A.D.2d 393, 394, 422 N.Y.S.2d 976, 978 (4th Dep't 1979) (stating that the in
loco parentis doctrine requires the petitioner to intend to assume all the
obligations of parenthood before he will be held to those obligations); Rutkowski
v. Wasko, 286 A.D. 327, 331, 143 N.Y.S.2d 1, 5 (3d Dep't 1955) (stating that
support for and a genuine interest in the child's welfare is required for in loco
parentis status); Pierce v. Helz, 64 Misc. 2d 131,137, 314 N.Y.S.2d 453, 460-61
(Sup. Ct. 1970) (stating that petitioner's involvement in the home, school and
recreational aspects of the child's life did not bestow in locoparentis status on
petitioner as a matter of law); Miller v. Davis, 49 Misc. 2d 764, 765, 268
N.Y.S.2d 490, 492-93 (Sup. Ct. 1966) (stating that the petitioner, to stand in loco
parentis, must establish more than the providing of instruction and care for the
general welfare of the child). See also In re Raquel Marie X., 76 N.Y.2d 387,
405, 559 N.E.2d 418, 426, 559 N.Y.S.2d 855, 863 (noting that when the state
has an interest in determining parental status, the focus should be on the parent-
child relationship), cert. deniedsub nom. Robert C. v. Miguel T., 498 U.S. 984
(1990).
FAMILY RECOGNITION
children are raised today, the court's ruling was premised simply
on the primacy of biological parenthood and the ultimate authority
of the biological parent to exert control over the adults with whom
her child associates. 127
The implicit assumption that the best interests of the child are
served only by adhering to rigid definitions of the term "parent"
drew vigorous dissent from now Chief Judge Judith Kaye, who
refused to "fix biology as the key to visitation rights," and rejected
the court's decision to "firmly close ... the door on all consider-
ation of the child's best interest in visitation proceedings... unless
the petitioner is a biological parent."' 2 By calling upon the
court's duty to look to "modem-day realities in giving definition to
statutory concepts"' 29 such as parent, Judge Kaye gave voice to
the theory that some children's interests can only be served by
adopting a functional approach to parent-child relationships.
The true oddity of the court's decision in Alison D., however,
lies in the inexplicable fact that the majority never referred to its
groundbreaking ruling in Braschi 3 ° Two years prior to its Alison
D. decision, the same court held that the term "family member"
must include those, such as gay couples, who share the functional
attributes of marital and biological family members.' In
Braschi, the court had explicitly recognized the necessity of
interpreting ambiguous statutory terms in a manner that would
further the stated goals of the law.'32
Alison D. and Braschi share so many significant attributes that
the court's silence is all the more glaring. Each case required the
court to give meaning to a familial term that the legislature had not
qualified or defined: the term "parent" in Alison D., and the
127 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 657, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588.
121 Id. at 657-61, 572 N.E.2d at 30-32, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 589-91 (Kaye, J.,
dissenting).
29 Id. at 661, 572 N.E.2d at 33, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 591.
130 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 543 N.E.2d 49, 544 N.Y.S.2d
784 (1989).
131 Id. at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789; see also supra notes
106-14 and accompanying text (discussing the Braschi opinion).
132 Id. at 212, 543 N.E.2d at 54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 789.
133 Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 656, 572 N.E.2d at 29, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 588
(defining "parent").
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term "family" in Braschi.'34 Each involved gay litigants seeking
acknowledgment of their family relationship, and, in each case,
access to the statutory right or benefit turned exclusively on
whether the plaintiff was a parent or a family member. The
relevant statutes in each case promoted very strong policy goals of
a highly personal nature: the best interests of the child in parental
disputes 35 and protection from eviction from one's home.'36
Lastly, the differences in outcome between Alison D. and Braschi
are magnified by the fact that membership on the court of appeals
had not changed in the two years between these two rulings.
Yet, while perhaps several dozen functional family members
who inhabit rent-controlled apartments can live more securely in
their homes, thousands of children stand to lose the guidance, love
and care of a functional parent. In a society with complex family
structures, failure to acknowledge different family relationships by
considering their functional aspects is more destructive of the goals
of family policy than it is useful.'37
The New York Court of Appeals had refused to extend its
interpretive analysis of "family" employed in a rent control case to
the term "parent" in a child visitation case. In In re ZJ.H,I38
however, the Wisconsin Supreme Court refused to apply its broad
interpretation of the child visitation and custody statute, which the
court had applied to extended family members, to a lesbian non-
adoptive mother who functioned as a parent.'39 Here, the child
was placed in the home of a lesbian couple for adoption. One of
the partners petitioned to adopt the child, and the other stayed
114 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 211, 543 N.E.2d at 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 788-89
(defining "family").
13' Alison D., 77 N.Y.2d at 659, 572 N.E.2d at 31, 569 N.Y.S.2d at 590
(Kaye, J., dissenting).
136 Braschi, 74 N.Y.2d at 214, 543 N.E.2d at 56, 544 N.Y.S.2d at 791.
'37 The court's decision in Alison D. drew critical responses from the family
law bar, who viewed the decision as creating an untenable situation for the
majority of children who have very close, loving relationships with, among
others, step-parents. See Ettelbrick, Who Is a Parent?, supra note 88, at 553 n.76
(citing Leonard Florescue, Law Struggles With Gay Parenting Issues, 8
MATRIMONIAL STRATEGIST 1 (1990)).
138 471 N.W.2d 202 (Wis. 1991).
9 Id. at 204.
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home full time to care for the child. 14' Before the adoption was
finalized, the couple ended their relationship and a struggle for
custody and visitation ensued.'1
4
The non-adoptive mother argued that the custody statute, which
explicitly allowed visitation only to a child's parent, grandparent or
great-grandparent, 4 1 should be interpreted to include functional
parents in order to further the policy goal of providing for the
child's best interests. 43 To support her argument, the non-
adoptive mother pointed to the court's ruling in In re D.MM,
in which the Wisconsin Supreme Court four years earlier had
interpreted the same statutory provision to allow standing by an
aunt who had functioned as a parent for a child to whom she had
been the legal guardian. 4 1 In D.MM, the court found the term
"parent" to be ambiguous, having not been defined or modified by
the legislature. 146 Turning to a standard dictionary for guidance,
the court found parent to include "'a person standing in loco
parentis although not a natural parent."1 47
When the same question was presented by the lesbian mother
in ZJ.H., however, the court recanted most of its reasoning,
pointing to the "bloodline"'4' relationship between the aunt and
the child in D.MM as a critical distinction. 49 The court brazenly
recast its decision, stating that the aunt had established her right to
visitation not as a "'parent,' but as an 'other person. ' 1
140 Until recently, it has not been clear that lesbian couples could adopt
jointly. Therefore, similar to couples who decide which partner will conceive and
bear the child, couples who choose adoption decide between them which will
proceed as the adoptive parent. As in donor insemination cases, the clear intent
of the parties is to raise the child together, each as an acknowledged parent.
141 ZJH., 471 N.W.2d at 204.
142 Id. at 207.
143 Id
144 404 N.W.2d 530 (Wis. 1987).
141 ZJ.H., 471 N.W.2d at 207.
146 D.MM, 404 N.W.2d at 534.
147 Id (quoting WEBSTER'S THIRD NEW INTERNATIONAL DICTIONARY
(1967)) (emphasis added).
141 Id. at 535.
149 ZJH., 471 N.W.2d at 207.
15o Id.
149
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The double standard often applied to lesbian and gay parents,
which was blatant in Z.JH., has been somewhat tempered by a
growing number of courts that are either adopting the functional
parent approach in lesbian parenting cases 5' or have expanded
the law to allow non-biological and non-adoptive lesbian and gay
parents to adopt children as second parents. Instead of leaving
lesbian and gay parents to confront the vagaries of individual
judges who may or may not find that functional relationships are
worthy of respect, some courts have provided a bright line rule for
adoption by such couples. 52 These courts have rejected the
51 After a series of cases across the country denying standing to functional
parents for purposes of visitation or custody, the trend may be slowly reversing.
Of special note is J.A.L. v. E.P.H., in which the court granted standing to a
lesbian functional parent to seek partial custody of the 10-month-old child that
she and her partner had brought into the world. J.A.L. v. E.P.H., No. 02456,
1996 WL 539760, at *7 (Pa. Sup. Ct. Sept. 19, 1996) ("We hold that the
evidence of record in this matter, particularly the evidence that J.A.L. and the
child were co-members of a nontraditional family, is sufficient to establish that
J.A.L. stood in loco parentis to the child and therefore has standing to seek
partial custody."). The court overturned the trial court's "overly technical and
mechanistic" decision denying standing, finding that "biological parenthood is not
the only source" of the right to seek custody. Id at *3. In direct contrast to the
Alison D. decision, the J.A.L. court found that
the need to guard the family from intrusions by third parties and to
protect the rights of the natural parent must be tempered by the
paramount need to protect the child's best interests. Thus, while it is
presumed that a child's best interest is served by maintaining the
family's privacy and autonomy, that presumption must give way where
the child has established strong psychological bonds with a person
who, although not a biological parent, has lived with the child and
provided care, nurture and affection, assuming in the child's eye a
stature like that of a parent.
Id. at *5.
152 Interestingly, the New York Court of Appeals partially remedied the
situation created by its decision in Alison D. by allowing unmarried partners,
whether gay or not, to adopt the children they raise with their partners. See, e.g.,
In re Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d 651, 656, 660 N.E.2d 397, 398, 636 N.Y.S.2d 716, 717
(1995) (holding that "the unmarried partner of a child's biological mother,
whether heterosexual or homosexual, who is raising the child together with the
biological parent, can become the child's second parent by means of adoption").
Perhaps the only appellate court thus far to consider and reject a construction of
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formality of marriage as a condition for couples to adopt.'
Instead, they allowed the policy of furthering children's interests
to supersede narrow constructions of the adoption laws that did not
anticipate nor explicitly ban adoption by same-sex couples.'54
an adoption statute that would allow lesbian couples this option for their children
is the Wisconsin Supreme Court. See In re Angel Lace M., 184 Wis. 2d 492
(1994) (denying adoption of the birth mother's child to her lesbian partner
because the biological father's parental rights were not terminated). The
Wisconsin Supreme Court later modified itself by allowing a non-biological
mother to pursue a claim for visitation rights. H.S.H.K. v. Knott, 533 N.W.2d
419, 420 (Wis.), cert. denied, 116 S. Ct. 475 (1995).
" See, e.g., In re K.M., 653 N.E.2d 888, 899 (I11. App. Ct. 1995) (holding
that unmarried cohabitants have standing to petition for adoption of a minor
child, regardless of sexual orientation, because it is not specifically prohibited by
the statute); In re Tammy, 619 N.E.2d 315, 316 (Mass. 1993) (affirming second
parent adoption of minor child by two unmarried women living together in a
committed relationship); Jacob, 86 N.Y.2d at 656, N.E.2d at 398, 636 N.Y.S.2d
at 717 (1995) (holding that biological mother's unmarried partner, who is raising
the child together with the biological parent, can become the child's second
parent regardless of sexual orientation); In re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d 1271, 1272
(Vt. 1993) (reversing and granting petition for adoption of minor child by one
of two unmarried women living together in a monogamous relationship, where
the other woman is the biological mother).
' Most adoption laws have language similar to the Vermont statute at issue
in B.L. V.B.:
A person or husband and wife together, of age and sound mind, may
adopt any other person as his or their heir with or without change of
name of the person adopted. A married man or a married woman shall
not adopt a person or be adopted without the consent of the other
spouse.
VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 431 (1989) (repealed); See In Re B.L.V.B., 628 A.2d
1271, 1273 (Vt. 1993).
Like the Vermont Supreme Court, most courts interpret this language as
allowing single people and married couples to adopt. B.L. V.B., 628 A.2dat 1273.
As a single person, the lesbian co-parent was allowed to adopt as a second parent
in B.L. V.B. Id. Furthermore, the requirement of spousal consent did not apply
because she was not married. Id. See also Tammy, 619 N.E.2d at 319 ("Clearly
absent [in the Massachusetts act] is any prohibition of adoption by two married
individuals like the petitioners."). The court's recognition in B.L. V.B. that the
lesbian partner could adopt as a second parent because it would be in the best
interests of the child was recently codified. The adoption statute at issue in
B.L. V.B. was repealed and replaced with the following:
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In fact, broad family definitions not only further but also enhance
the legislative goal of adoption.55
As the cultural vision of family incorporates those who love and
care for one another, strict adherence to formal definitions will only
obstruct the broader social policy of supporting family nurturance,
caretaking and commitment. Just as these family functions are
hardly the sole province of married couples, same-sex couples'
eventual access to legal marriage will not erase the need to
acknowledge, legally and culturally, functional family relationships.
So long as couples, both straight and gay, continue to fall in love,
live together and raise children together, the need to continue
broadening the vision of family beyond the structures of marriage
and biology will exist.
(a) Subject to this title, any person may adopt or be adopted by
another person for the purpose of creating the relationship of
parent and child between them.
(b) If a family unit consists of a parent and the parent's partner,
and adoption is in the best interest of the child, the partner
of a parent may adopt a child of the parent. Termination of
the parent's parental rights is unnecessary in an adoption
under this subsection.
Vf. STAT. ANN. tit. 15A, § 1-102 (Supp. 1996).
155 Judge Eve Preminger offered the most eloquent statement in support of
definitions of family that do not turn on marriage for purposes of second parent
adoptions by lesbian co-parents:
[T]his is not a matter which arises in a vacuum. Social fragmentation
and the myriad configurations of modem families have presented us
with new problems and complexities that can not be solved by
idealizing the past. Today a child who receives proper nutrition,
adequate schooling and supportive sustaining shelter is among the
fortunate, whatever the source. A child who also receives the love and
nurture of even a single parent can be counted among the blessed. Here
this Court finds a child who has all of the above benefits and two
adults dedicated to his welfare, secure in their loving partnership, and
determined to raise him to the very best of their considerable abilities.
There is no reason in law, logic or social philosophy to obstruct such
a favorable situation.
In re Evan, 153 Misc. 2d 844, 852, 583 N.Y.S.2d 997, 1002 (Sur. Ct. 1992).
FAMILY RECOGNITION
C. Function, Not Social Concepts of Morality, Should Guide
Family Definitions
Legal family definitions are largely driven by an ideal of sexual
morality which places heterosexual intercourse at the center of
marriage. Marriage distinguishes proper sex from immoral sex,
separating incorrigible women from virtuous women.'56 In some
states, heterosexual intercourse is the only sexual activity that is
legal as it is the only sexual activity that leads to reproduction and
family creation. Where reproduction is not possible within
marriage, legal fictions, such as adoption, are created to further the
cultural purposes for marriage and to further the pretense of
reproduction within marriage.'57
Those who deviate from marriage and heterosexual intercourse
in creating families suffer the cultural and legal price of stigma and
invisibility in the law. Laws declaring children of unmarried
women to be illegitimate cast shame on the mother and child. Her
pregnancy is visible proof of her downfall, a stigma that her male
sexual partner will never have to endure. Until recently, many
middle-class, pregnant, single women who were not cajoled into
marriage to the father were hidden away during pregnancy and
forced to consent to their child's adoption. Terms such as "teen
pregnancy," "single parenthood," and "welfare mother"' 8 carry
a cultural message of moral intolerance that serves to stigmatize
rather than prompt genuine attention to the problem. Divorced
156 See D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra note 28, at 17-18.
157 See generally Jane Schacter, The Gay Civil Rights Debate in the States:
Decoding the Discourse of Equivalents, 29 HARV. C.R.-C.L. L. REV. 283 (1994).
158 Hostility to welfare and public assistance programs is fanned by the
media's focus on young, lower class, mostly women of color who stand on the
verge of requiring public assistance to support their families. See Lucy A.
Williams, Race, Rat Bites and Unfit Mothers: How Media Discourse Informs
Welfare Legislation Debate, 22 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 1159, 1163-68 (1995).
Abortion access is legally denied to women who cannot afford to pay, yet those
who bear children are likewise denied any assistance in raising them. See Laura
M. Friedman, Family Cap and the Unconstitutional Conditions Doctrine:
Scrutinizing a Welfare Woman's Right to Bear Children, 56 OHIO ST. L.J. 637,
659-60 (1995).
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parents who maintain a sexual relationship with an unmarried
partner pay the price of losing their children. 5 9 Judges tend to
concentrate on the sexual lives of lesbian and gay parents, ignoring
the truly relevant inquiry into whether these parents, and their
partners, are loving, caring and capable of providing a good home
to their children. 16 ° The moral preference for a certain form of
family that centers around marriage can lead to tragic, sometimes
ludicrous, results.' 6'
159 Jarrett v. Jarrett, 400 N.E.2d 421, 426 (Ill.) (transferring custody of three
children from mother to father because the divorced mother lived with her male
partner, thereby threatening the moral development of her children), cert. denied,
449 U.S. 927 (1980); Bottoms v. Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d 102, 107-08 (Va. 1995)
(removing child from custody of lesbian mother because she engaged in
"immoral" sexual behavior with her partner, with whom she lived). Many
parents, particularly lesbian and gay parents, are faced with the Hobson's choice
between living with an adult partner or having custody of their children.
60 See, e.g., Ward v. Ward, No. 95-4184, 1996 Fla. App. LEXIS 9130, at
*1 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1996) (removing child from custody of her lesbian
mother to custody of father who previously had been convicted for murdering his
first wife); Bottoms, 457 S.E.2d at 108 (removing child from custody of his
lesbian mother because she engaged in "immoral" sexual behavior with her live-
in partner).
When courts allow prejudice and anxieties about sexual mores to
overwhelm other evidence in a custody case, they stray from the goal
of determining the best interests of the child. The needs of the
particular child are marginalized, distorted, or entirely obscured.
Whether courts are motivated by a desire to enforce perceived societal
norms, by stereotypical and uninformed views of lesbians and gay men,
or by a sincere, if misguided, desire to protect a child, the result is the
same: Children are unnecessarily removed from loving and secure
homes where they have been thriving, or their contact with a caring
and concernedparent is needlessly and unreasonably constrained. Thus,
the failure of the judicial system to develop and adhere to the
appropriate test harms not only the nonconforming parent but also the
child.
Shapiro, supra note 104, at 626.
161 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989) (denying visitation to
biological father, Michael, who lived for a time with his child, Victoria, and the
mother, Carole, before the mother reconciled with her husband, Gerald).
According to Justice Scalia:
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Views of marriage, sexuality and reproduction have, however,
undergone shifts in moral tolerance for many different kinds of
families. 6 ' Factors contributing to this shifting view include
women's increased public role in society; greater consciousness of
and commitment to women's equality; development of and
increased dependence upon reproductive technologies; heightened
visibility of and respect for lesbian and gay relationships; greater
expectation of individual autonomy vis-d-vis other family members
and the government with regard to family decisions; 63 and
changing demographics of the age at which people choose to
marry. 16
4
These changes are forcing the shift from form to function in
family definitions.'65 Rather than a linear passage from childhood
to adulthood, marriage to parenthood, old age to death, most
Americans no longer follow such an even course. Divorce
and remarriage, tolerance for both gay and straight non-marital
[Tihe legal issue in the present case reduces to whether the relationship
between persons in the situation of Michael and Victoria has been
treated as a protected family unit under the historic practices of our
society, or whether on any other basis it has been accorded special
protection. We think it impossible to find that it has. In fact, quite to
the contrary, our traditions have protected the marital family (Gerald,
Carole, and the child they acknowledge to be theirs) against the sort of
claim Michael asserts.
Id. at 124.
162 See COONTZ, supra note 3, at 180-83.
163 For example, some women have the right to choose abortion free of
governmental control and free of their husband's control. See generally Planned
Parenthood v. Casey, 505 U.S. 833 (1992) (striking down provision of law
requiring woman to obtain her husband's consent in order to have an abortion);
Roe v. Wade, 410 U.S. 113 (1973) (establishing a constitutional right to choose
abortion). See also DIZARD & GADLIN, supra note 3, at 67-99 (analyzing the
change from a family-centered to an autonomous society). Contrast American
family and sexual life today to that of the early immigrants, where privacy was
a premium and in which neighbors, clergy and the community in general felt it
was their role to monitor the sexual relationships of individuals and to punish
transgressions from the moral and legal codes. D'EMILIO & FREEDMAN, supra
note 28, at 27-38.
164 COONTZ, supra note 3, at 180-206.
165 COONTZ, supra note 3, at 180-83.
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relationships, greater commonality of single parenthood, blended
families and the use of reproductive technology all paint a picture
of both greater diversity of family relationships and the pressing
need to formulate a view of family around function. Laws that once
seemed logically centered on narrow definitions of family, now
seem both illogical and unjustly harsh. 166
Attributing legal and cultural significance to functional family
relationships serves many valid purposes. First, such attribution
mirrors the expectations and reality of people who without question
view themselves as family, and removes the vulnerability that
causes unnecessary stress on their ties to each other. For example,
the mutual agreement of a lesbian couple who choose donor
insemination to conceive and bear children generally carries with
it the expectation that they will be recognized equally under the law
as well. The children of these couples, likewise, grow up making
no distinction between the two parents. Should the biological
mother die or become ill, or the couple break up, these family
relationships can effectively be rendered void by judges who look
at family only along formal definitional lines, rather than at the
substance of the relationships that exist. Undoubtedly, marriage
could provide some protection for these relationships,' 67 but even
then, overattachment to marriage as the guidepost could equally
destroy the expectations of the parties. Giving weight to the parties'
expectations undoubtedly strengthens family ties by allowing the
family members to act without fear that a court or other body of
authority will render their family non-existent.
166 For example, the court in Braschi v. Stahl Associates clearly understood
the harshness of allowing a person who had lived in a rent-controlled apartment
for 10 years to be evicted simply because he shared no legal relationship with his
male partner. 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 543 N.E.2d 49, 53-54, 544 N.Y.S.2d 784,
788-89 (1989).
167 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1) (Mckinney 1988 & Supp. 1996). "Any
child born to a married woman by means of artificial insemination ... shall be
deemed the legitimate, natural child of the husband and his wife for all
purposes." Id. Fatherhood is premised not on biology but on marriage to the
child's mother at the time of birth. See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110,
121, 129 (1989) (holding valid California statute presuming natural mother's
husband to be father of the child).
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Recognizing functional families lends support to those parties'
emotional and economic well-being. For example, many children
grow to love and to depend upon a step-parent with whom they
have no biological or legal relationship. In many instances, the
step-parent is the only mother or father the child has known. Rules
which strictly allow only biological or adoptive parents to seek
visitation prevent a step-parent or other co-parent from maintaining
relationships that are fundamentally important to children. These
children would lose not only the emotional, but also the financial
support of these parents.
Recognition of functional families also allows both the law and
society to better address difficulties that arise which may have
tragic consequences. The tragedy of Karen Thompson and Sharon
Kowalski's treatment by the Minnesota courts"' focused on the
inability of the lower court to recognize that Karen was more
dedicated to caring for Sharon, better understood her needs and was
more determined to help Sharon recover than Sharon's biological
family. Had Karen and Sharon been considered a family at an
earlier stage, her needs could have been met much sooner. Instead,
the morality of their relationship kept them apart. 169
Similarly, an Ohio trial court went out of its way to overlook
both the clear language and purposes of the state's domestic
violence law. In State v Hadinger,170 the lower court denied a
woman's request for a temporary restraining order against her
female partner who, she alleged, was abusing her.'7 ' The domes-
tic violence law of Ohio allowed for temporary restraining orders
where the parties cohabit.77 Though the women lived together,
168 See supra Part II.A (discussing the Kowalski case).
169 See generally THOMPSON & ANDRZEJEWSKI, supra note 36 (recounting
the Kowalski story).
170 573 N.E.2d 1191 (Ohio Ct. App. 1991).
171 Id. at 1192 (summarizing on appeal the actions taken by trial court as
"dismissing sua sponte the domestic violence charge against defendant from
which plaintiff now appeals").
172 See id.; OHIO REV. CODE ANN. § 2919.26(A)(1) (Anderson 1996)
(authorizing restraining orders for "family or household member[s]"). The Ohio
domestic violence statute defines "family or household member" as:
(a) Any of the following who is residing or has resided with the
offender:
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the trial court, apparently appalled by their relationship, ignored the
legislature's clear desire to provide a remedy to victims of domestic
violence, and erroneously ruled that only opposite-sex couples
could legally cohabit, and denied the woman's request.'73 For-
tunately, the appellate court reversed, holding that the term
"cohabit," as used in the domestic violence statute, also applied to
two persons of the same sex.
174
The obstacle for lesbians and gay men is not that they cannot
enter the institution of marriage. The true problem is that lesbian
and gay families are widely excluded from the broader institution
of family due to morally-based views about their sexual orien-
tation 75 and the nontraditional avenues used by lesbian and gay
(i) A spouse, a person living as a spouse, or a former spouse of
the offender ....
(2) "Person living as a spouse" means a person who is living or
has lived with the offender in a common law marital
relationship, who otherwise is cohabiting with the offender,
or who otherwise has cohabited with the offender within one
year prior to the date of the alleged commission of the act in
question.
Id. § 2919.25(E)(1)(a)(i), (2) (Anderson 1996) (emphasis added).
173 Hadinger, 573 N.E.2d at 1191.
17' The Ohio Court of Appeals concluded:
[T]he legislature intended that the domestic violence statute provide
protection to persons who are cohabiting regardless of their sex. We
believe that to read the domestic violence statute otherwise would
eviscerate the efforts of the legislature to safeguard, regardless of
gender, the rights of victims of domestic violence.
Id. at 1193.
17' Lesbians and gay men have struggled for over 40 years to retain the right
to parent the children they conceived and raised before publicly disclosing
themselves as homosexuals. See, e.g., Nadler v. Superior Court, 63 Cal. Rptr.
352 (Ct. App. 1967) (reversing a holding that mother's lesbianism made her an
unfit parent as a matter of law).
For years courts have relied, implicitly and explicitly, on the assump-
tion that having a lesbian or gay parent would be harmful to a child.
This has been devastating in the area of child custody, where parents
have been deprived of custody and visitation with their children on the
basis of such unfounded assumptions.
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partners to have children.'76 Courts are still locked into a very
narrow vision of proper family form that ignores the true needs of
the members of lesbian and gay families. 77
D. Inadequacy of the Traditional Marriage Model
The different-sex model of marriage is not simply a legal
anachronism.'78 Nor is the reproductive focus of marriage to be
ignored by advocates for same-sex marriage who claim that,
because heterosexual married couples are not required to have
children, the procreative role of marriage may not be used as an
argument to deny same-sex marriage.' The fact is that the
Marc E. Elovitz, Adoption by Lesbian and Gay People: The Use and Mis-Use
of Social Science Research, 2 DUKE J. ON GENDER L. & POL'Y 207, 224 (1995).
The numerous reported lesbian and gay custody cases document such a history.
See Paula L. Ettelbrick, Legal Issues Facing the Non-Traditional Family, in
ESTATE PLANNING & ADMINISTRATION 1994, at 299 (PLI Tax Law & Estate
Planning Course Handbook Series No. D4-5250, 1994); Nan D. Hunter & Nancy
D. Polikoff, Custody Rights of Lesbian Mothers: Legal Theory and Litigation
Strategy, 25 BUFF. L. REv. 691 (1976); Julie Shapiro, supra note 104; Stephen
B. Pershing, Symposium, Defining Family: Gays, Lesbians, and the Meaning of
Family, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 289 (1994); Annamay T. Sheppard,
Lesbian Mothers II: Long Night's Journey Into Day, 14 WOMEN'S RTS. L. REP.
185 (1992); David M. Rosenblum, Comment, Custody Rights of Gay andLesbian
Parents, 36 VILL. L. REV. 1665 (1991); Steve Susoeff, Comment, Assessing
Children's Best Interests When a Parent is Gay or Lesbian: Toward a Rational
Custody Standard, 32 UCLA L. REV. 852 (1985).
176 Lesbian and gay partners can parent through various means,
including heterosexual intercourse, adoption, foster-care, donor insemination and
co-parenting. David K. Flaks, Gay and Lesbian Families: Judicial Assumptions,
Scientific Realities, 3 WM. & MARY BILL RTS. J. 345, 345 (1994).
177 See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110, 118 (1989) ("California law,
like nature itself, makes no provision for dual fatherhood.").
'7 Marriage was not created to give form to romantic love, which is shared
by straight and gay couples alike. Marriage was premised primarily on property,
both the property each individual brought to the marriage and the idea that the
wife was the property of the husband, available to him for sex, housekeeping,
child rearing and overall caretaking.
179 See ESKRIDGE, supra note 10, at 96 (arguing that discrimination against
sterile, impotent or aged couples on this basis would be unacceptable and that
marriage serves other more important goals); Wolfson, supra note 17, at 579
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origins of marriage are deeply imbedded in procreation and the
two-parent family. The lesbian and gay community will need more
than marriage to address the many issues of their family structures
that will never fit the heterosexual model.
The case of Thomas S. v Robin Y'o best illustrates one
aspect of this problem. 8' Robin and her partner, Sandra, shared
in the parenting of two daughters, one of whom was conceived
with the sperm of Thomas.'82 At the time of insemination, it was
agreed that Thomas would not serve as a functional father, but
would be introduced to the child when she began to ask questions
about her "father."' 83 When Ry (the daughter) was three years
old, they introduced her to Thomas. 4 Everyone got along
famously, and the adults decided on occasional visits with
Thomas.'85 For many years, Thomas visited Robin, Sandra and
the girls in New York a couple of times a year. 8 6 Occasionally,
the family would visit Thomas and his male partner in San
Francisco. There is no doubt that the relationship among all of
them was warm and loving. 87 There is also no doubt that the
(noting that the Supreme Court distinguished marriage from procreation long ago
by stating "[i]t is an association that promotes a way of life, not causes ... or
social projects").
180 209 A.D.2d 298, 618 N.Y.S.2d 356 (1st Dep't 1994).
... Additionally, the two-adult model for marriage does not fit multiple adult
family units, such as that at issue in Baer v. Brookhaven, nor does it account for
the familial structures that many lesbians and gay men form in response to
alienation from biological family members and the need to find nurturance in an
often hostile world. See Bear v. Brookhaven, 73 N.Y.2d 942, 942, 537 N.E.2d
619, 619, 540 N.Y.S.2d 234, 234 (1989) (finding members of group home not
related by blood, adoption or marriage considered to be functional family for
purposes of zoning ordinance); BROWNING, supra note 32, at 151 (discussing
domestic partnership referendum passed in San Francisco, California and the
common belief that society will benefit if people live as families).
182 Thomas S., 209 A.D.2d at 298, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 356. Sandra's experience
of never knowing her father prompted their decision to use known donors for
both of their children.
183 Id. at 299, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 357.
184 Id.
1ss Id.
186 Id
187 Id.
160
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visits were "family" visits, meaning that Ry never travelled alone
to visit Thomas nor did Thomas spend time alone with Ry when he
visited.188 Aside from his biological relationship with Ry,
Thomas' relationship with the family could be characterized as one
of a close friend or an extended family member. He did not
financially support Ry, he was not consulted by the mothers in the
making of decisions concerning Ry, nor did he otherwise execute
the day to day functions of a parent.'89 Ry had no relationship
with any other of Thomas' family members beyond his life partner.
In fact, most of his blood family did not even know of Ry's exis-
tence. 190
Thomas eventually decided that he wished to introduce Ry to
his biological family for the first time.' 9' Feeling that this step
went beyond their agreement, the mothers refused.' 92 As Thomas
became more insistent, the mothers became more resistant. Thomas
then filed a paternity action. The trial court ruled that Thomas was
estopped from claiming paternity. 93 The court found that from
Ry's perspective, her family consisted of her mothers and her older
sister. Thomas, while known as her biological father, was not Ry's
functional father. The appellate division overturned the trial court's
ruling, emphasizing Thomas' biological relationship with Ry, which
entitled him to establish his claim for paternity.'94 The mothers
appealed, but before the case went on to New York's highest court,
Thomas withdrew his request for paternity and visitation, leaving
the paternity decision in place and his relationship with the couple
and their daughters in tatters.
It is far from clear whether marriage would have saved this
family. According to the U.S. Supreme Court, 95 the state's
interest in preserving the marital union between the mother and her
husband overrides the rights of even a biological father who
188 Id. at 299-300, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
"9 Id. at 302-03, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 360.
190 Id. at 299-300, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
191 Id.
192 Id. at 300, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 358.
193 Id.
194 Id. at 306-07, 618 N.Y.S.2d at 362.
'9' See Michael H. v. Gerald D., 491 U.S. 110 (1989).
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functioned as a parent. 96 The thought of extending Justice
Scalia's vociferous support for the marital union to a married
lesbian couple is amusing to contemplate, but difficult to
imagine. 97 Anyone who has ever represented lesbian and gay
parents knows that there is always a gay exception to family law
rules.' 9 Under New York law, the husband (read "spouse") of a
woman inseminated with the sperm of an unknown donor is legally
presumed to be the father.' 99 However, the statute provides no
guidance with regard to a known donor, such as Thomas.2"°
New York law also allows second parent adoption by the
unmarried partner of a biological parent,20' whereby Sandra could
have adopted Ry without Robin having to terminate her legal
relationship with Ry. While this option would have secured
Sandra's relationship with Ry, it does not allow parenting options
for Thomas, assuming the parties agreed to pursue such a relation-
ship.
The absence of a marital relationship was irrelevant to the
events in Thomas. Even if there were an agreement that Thomas
would act as father to Ry, Sandra, as the second mother to Ry,
196 Therefore, if Sandra and Robin had married, Thomas' relationship with
Ry would have been negated.
197 Justice Scalia's view of lesbian and gay men was made painfully clear
in his dissent to the Court's decision overturning a voter initiative that would
have prevented state officials from passing laws banning sexual-orientation
discrimination. See Romer v. Evans, 116 S. Ct. 1620, 1629 (1996) (Scalia, J.,
dissenting) (stating that the initiative was "a modest attempt by seemingly
tolerant Coloradans to preserve traditional sexual mores against efforts of a
politically powerful minority to revise these mores through use of the laws").
' See supra notes 13 8-50 and accompanying text (discussing ZJ.H.).
'99 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 73(1).
200 See Crouch v. McIntyre, 780 P.2d 239, 246-47 (Or. Ct. App. 1989)
(holding that the state statute on artificial insemination, which is silent with
regard to known donors, violates a known donor's federal constitutional due
process rights if it could be established that he and the mother agreed that he
should have rights and responsibilities of fatherhood, and in reliance on that
agreement, he donated his sperm), cert. denied, 495 U.S. 905 (1990).
201 See N.Y. DOM. REL. LAW § 117(1)(d) (McKinney 1988); see also In re
Camilla, 163 Misc. 2d 272, 620 N.Y.S.2d 897 (Fam. Ct. 1994) (noting that N.Y.
DOM. REL. LAW. § 117(1)(d) "is interpreted to apply to all 'second-parent'
adoptions").
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must also be recognized as a parent, therefore extending the two-
parent mold allowed by marriage.
If Robin and Sandra married, how would Thomas' relationship
with Ry be defined? Would Thomas be able to adopt as a third-
parent? Would Robin, Sandra and Thomas have to marry one
another in order to clarify the legal roles of the three adults to the
child?20 2 Can a role be created for Thomas that would not
empower him with full parental rights, but only the right to
maintain his relationship with Ry through visitation? What about
Thomas' life partner, who would clearly be severed from any
recognized relationship with Thomas, functional or otherwise, were
Thomas to marry Robin and Sandra? What would be the relation-
ship between Thomas and Ry's older sister, who shared no
biological relationship with each other? What result if Thomas was
a straight, married man with other children, or if he was Sandra's
brother?
The clarity that marriage arguably provides for two-person
couples without children blurs when there are more than two
parents, either functional or biological. And while there are
solutions to these questions, it is doubtful that they lie in same-sex
marriage. Lesbian and gay parenting simply do not fit the marriage
mold. Thus, the parties' relationships should be governed by their
clear intentions and the functional relationships they create. If, for
instance, Sandra and Robin felt secure that their agreement with
Thomas that he will not be a full-fledged parent would be respected
202 Fear that same-sex marriage would create a slippery slope toward
polygamous marriages is used frequently by the opposition to stir up hysteria
over the thought that lesbian and gay couples may eventually win the right to
marry. See Carl Ingram, Wilson, Lungren Back Bill Against Gay Marriages, L.A.
TIMES, July 9, 1996, at Al (discussing California politicians' concerns that the
defeat of the Defense of Marriage Act would lead to polygamous marriages);
Cheryl Wetzstein, Thursday is D-Day to Ban Gay Marriage: Hawaii Lawsuit
Could Open the Door, WASH. TIMES, Apr. 1, 1996, at A2 (noting that
"opponents of same-sex marriages warn that legalization of gay and lesbian
marriage opens the door for polygamy or other now-illegal arrangements"). The
fact is, though, that in many parenting contexts, the creation of lesbian and gay
families may require recognition of more than two adults as parents where the
lesbian couple and the sperm donor agree that all of them will function as
parents.
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and upheld, they may have been less reluctant to allow Ry's
relationship with him develop differently as she got older. It was
the fear that a court could take Ry away that led Sandra and Robin
to sever the relationship with Thomas the moment he filed the
paternity action.
Likewise, if Thomas' biological relationship with Ry did not
potentially entitle him to the full privileges of parenthood,
including the right to seek custody or, in New York, the right to
request visitation," 3 Robin and Sandra would not have had their
primacy as parents and their family threatened. Their decision not
to allow Ry to visit Thomas' family would not have been put into
question, at least from a legal perspective, as the state may not so
intrude into family decisions." 4
Instead of marriage, the solution to defining many lesbian and
gay family relationships is best accomplished by giving legal effect
to parenting agreements and the actual functioning of their
relationships. If lesbian couples knew that their agreements
of co-equal parenting vis-d-vis each other, as well as the agree-
ments between themselves and their sperm donors would be
enforced, the power dynamic that infects many of these families
would shift dramatically. Biological mothers and sperm donors
could no longer use the powerful leverage that their biology allows
them under the law to claim an absolute right to parental status.
Children of gay and lesbian parents would have the security of
maintaining the parental relationships that developed.
Second, these families would be better protected if the role of
known sperm donors could legally be limited. While some couples
want full involvement of the donor as a father, the more traditional
agreement is that the donor is not a functional father. Development
of this concept of "limited parenthood," like limited partnership in
the business world, would secure the relationships of all parties and
203 See, e.g., In re Jessica R., 163 A.D.2d 553, 554 (2d Dep't 1990) (staying
order granting visitation to paternal grandparents pending the hearing and
determination of an abuse and neglect proceeding against the child's father).
204 See Alison D. v. Virginia M., 77 N.Y.2d 651, 656-57, 572 N.E.2d 27,
29-30, 569 N.Y.S.2d 586, 588-89 (1991) ("To allow the courts to award
visitation-a limited form of custody-to a third person would necessarily impair
the parents' right to custody and control.").
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identify their role with regard to the child. In the Sandra, Robin
and Thomas situation, a clearly defined, legally recognized limited
parenthood role could potentially have diffused the situation. If
Robin and Sandra could feel secure that Thomas' role would never
extend beyond a right to visit with Ry should the adults' relation-
ship break down, they may have been more willing to give Thomas
what he wanted-the chance to introduce Ry to his own extended
family. As long as the threat that he could remove Ry from her
home is a legal possibility, Sandra and Robin will never feel secure
in moving beyond the original agreement. Likewise, if Thomas
knew unconditionally that his agreement to be a sperm donor with
the possibility of some role in the child's life could never extend
beyond that limited role, he, too, might not have pushed his will on
them.
The benefit of family definition advocacy lies in its flexible
approach to defining family, not as a set of strict rules that have
little relevance to the real ways that human beings function. It
recognizes that "fictitious legal distinctions or genetic history"2 °5
are less relevant to family formation than love, commitment and
caretaking.
CONCLUSION
There is no doubt that marriage currently represents the social
and legal badge of full citizenship. With a history in which slaves
could not marry, people of color could not marry Whites, and Jews
could not marry non-Jews, there is no doubt that marriage has been
used to control one's full sense of being a citizen. But, it does not
need to remain that way.
Through its history of family definition advocacy, the lesbian
and gay community has taken on the challenge of showing the
range of family relationships that exist in our society. As we have
found, marriage laws, with their explicit "one man, one woman"
language, are not the only laws that forbid us entry into family.
Any laws that presume a heterosexual relationship in general keep
205 Braschi v. Stahl Assocs., 74 N.Y.2d 201, 211, 543 N.E.2d 49, 54, 544
N.Y.S.2d 784, 789 (1989).
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us from the borders of family. By questioning the building of an
entire system on marriage and biology, when so many, gay and
straight alike, do not fit that particular model, we create a vision of
family that would encompass the way in which most citizens live
their lives as family.
The marriage struggle alone leaves unchallenged the basic
premise upon which family is built, a premise that we have long
fought to change. In the end, even if the marriage struggle is
resolved, we would still end up with the status quo: healthcare
benefits, adoption and many other benefits and privileges deter-
mined according to marital status. Our vision of family has always
been broader than that. Marriage is not what makes a family. Love,
commitment and caretaking make a family. No group knows that
more intimately than lesbians and gay men.
